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Introduction	  
In Morocco, November 2014 will be remembered by the heaviest rains in years: during 
only four days, the record-high rainfall produced massive flash floods which made 
buildings and bridges collapse around the country. In Ferkla, 150 million cubic meters of 
water, the average annual discharge, flowed through river Rhéris. People gathered on the 
riverbanks to watch the muddy water flow by. On one hand, they rejoiced since the flood 
would fill up their wells and give a good harvest after a long drought. On the other, they 
mourned since all that water was flowing by, uncaptured, and wasted, into the desert. 
Paradoxically, this incident crystallizes the essence of this thesis; water scarcity is not the 
result of absolute shortages of physical supply, it is the result of poverty, inequality and 
unequal power relationships, as well as flawed water management policies that exacerbate 
scarcity (UNDP 2006). This is a study on socio-political perspectives of water scarcity 
from a political ecology perspective. 
Originally my plan was to study customary water management and socio-economic 
changes in the oasis of Ferkla but it quickly became clear that a large body of research had 
already covered both the functioning of the systems and the changing socio-economical 
and environmental context in the oases of southeast Morocco. For example, a Moroccan 
anthropologist, Hsain Ilahiane, has studied socio-economic changes, community-based 
resource management and power relations between Berbers, Arabs and Haratine, from 
anthropology and political ecology’s perspective (Ilahiane 1996; 2001a; 2001b). While 
Ilahiane’s work has focused on Ziz valley, Hein de Haas has studied migration’s role in 
transforming rural livelihoods in Todgha valley (de Haas 1998; 2003; 2006; de Haas & El 
Ghanjou 2000), of which Ferkla is not far from. 
Moroccan researchers conducting research in oasis zones, such as Ait Hamza et al. 
(2010), Alali & Benmohammad (2013), Kabiri (2005) and Taibi & El Hannani (2004), 
often view the changes from a crisis perspective. In short, the oasis crisis narrative claims 
that irresponsible water use practices have led to deepening water scarcity and concomitant 
socio-economic ‘mutations’. It is a “classical” political ecology degradation and 
marginalisation narrative, which Robbins has summarized as following: “Otherwise 
environmentally innocuous production systems undergo transition to overexploitation of 
natural resources on which they depend as a response to state development intervention 
and/or increasing integration in regional and global markets. This may lead to increasing 
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poverty, and cyclically, increasing overexploitation.” (Robbins 2012, p. 21). The 
degradation and marginalisation thesis also presumes that community resource 
management becomes unsustainable as a result of state efforts to enclose traditional 
collective property or impose new institutions, and that modernist development efforts to 
improve production systems contradictorily lead to decreased sustainability of local 
practice and a linked decrease in the equity of resource distribution. (Robbins 2012, p. 21). 
To move beyond the oasis crisis narrative, which both convicts and victimizes the 
farmers, this thesis will focus on local inhabitants’ experiences of and responses to water 
scarcity. Although water management in Ferkla oasis is still partially regulated by 
customary village councils, water access increasingly depends on formal property rights 
and modern technology: private land ownership topped with well permits and state-
provisioned tap water connections. The aim is to describe the results of this transfer from 
community-based resource management to a space of institutional hybridity comprising of 
customary and formal socio-legal institutions and actors, and evaluate how this transfer of 
authority from customary water user communities to individuals and state organisations, as 
well as related national laws and policies have affected water access and availability in the 
oasis. Have the state efforts indeed led to unsustainable resource management and 
decreased equity of resource distribution? 
The conceptual framework for this study is derived from discourses of water 
scarcity and security. Water security is the capacity of a population to safeguard 
sustainable access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining 
livelihoods, human wellbeing, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection 
against water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving ecosystems in 
a climate of peace and political stability (UN-Water 2013). Water scarcity is therefore 
unavailability of and/or inaccessibility to adequate, reliable quantities of acceptable quality 
water. 
Actual water availability fluctuates over time and space and is dependent on both 
natural causes and anthropogenic effects, or the hydrosocial cycle as Swyngedouw (2009) 
calls it. Perceptions of water scarcity emerge when ecosystemic factors and processes (lack 
of rain, drought) fail to produce customary supplies; when human actions and activities 
influence supply and/or increase demand; when changes in power and economy affect 
access; and, when valued human uses conflict with valued ecosystemic needs (Johnston 
2003, p. 81).  
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Against the theoretical background of political ecology, I formulated the following 
research questions: 
 
1. How have social power relations affected access to and control over waters in 
Ferkla oasis? 
a. How do water availability and access to waters vary between small- and 
large-scale farmers and why? 
b. To what extent has control over water been transferred from customary 
socio-legal institutions to individuals and state organisations? 
 
Through these research questions I will describe the water cultures of Ferkla oasis and how 
different stakeholders perceive water scarcity. Access to waters is in plural because there 
are different sources of water (surface or groundwater), different uses of water (agricultural 
and domestic) and different modes of access to water (common, private or public). 
Drawing from Crow and Sultana (2002), modes of access refer to the methods and 
technologies of accessing water: private ownership of land and a pump, common property 
access, and state-backed provision (municipal tap water). 
I take into account the water management institutions (laws, policies, customs and 
organisations) as well as the actual physical water availability. Following Mehta (2007) 
and Budds (2004), I separate stakeholders into user groups and analyse how and why their 
water access differs. The user groups are formed on the basis of endowments, or an actor’s 
rights and resources (Leach, Mearns & Scoones 1999). The most relevant resources and 
rights are the means of agricultural production and inclusion into institutions: water access 
(customary water rights, modes of access) and land ownership as well as formal property 
rights and participation in associations. These variables do not allow a complete analysis of 
social power relations as suggested by Swyngedouw (2009) but they form a partial picture 
presenting the economic and political aspects. This will be elaborated further in the next 
section Theoretical framework. 
To differentiate between the rights systems used by communities and the state, I’ve 
chosen to use ‘customary’ when referring to local, traditional institutions, and ‘formal’ 
when referring to state institutions. In legal terms, the systems would be called common 
law and statutory law. While the antonym of formal is informal, or even illegal, in Ferkla 
the statutory institutions are by no means more legitimate than the customary ones. The 
issues related to competing socio-legal systems are central to political ecology.  
  4 
Theoretical	  framework	  and	  literature	  review	  
The theoretical framework of this study is political ecology, which is a research orientation 
combining theories and practices of several fields of studies, such as human geography, 
political science and environmental studies. The focus on both social and biophysical 
aspects of human-environment relations makes political ecology a perfect framework for 
researching water issues, or as Swyngedouw calls them, hydrosocial relations (2009). Most 
research in political ecology is based on the notion that social and environmental 
conditions –the relationships between actors, such as state organisations or farmers, and 
the links between actors and their physical environment– are constituted through power 
relations (Bryant 1997; 1998; Swyngedouw 2009). Those relations are unequal since actors 
possess different power capabilities in struggles over access to environmental resources. 
The predominant research questions are how water and power relations intersect to shape 
differential access and outcomes among diverse social groups, and how power is produced 
through water in ways that maintain, or even increase, inequality, exclusion, and poverty 
(Budds & Sultana 2013). 
To facilitate the analysis of hydrosocial relations, I follow the definition and 
categorization suggested by Swyngedouw (2009). According to him, social power relations 
(material, economic, political, or cultural) through which hydrosocial transformations take 
place, define who is entitled to what quality, kind and volumes of water (access to) and on 
the other hand, who should control, manage and/or decide how the hydrosocial cycle is 
organized (control over) (Swyngedouw 2009, p. 58). 
Access to water depends on the actual and historic water use and distribution 
practices, including the different norms and discourses user groups refer to when claiming 
access (Ahlers & Zwarteveen 2009). Norms and rules have different origins and sources of 
legitimization, such as formal state law or customary socio-legal systems, and the struggle 
for the most legitimate one is constant. Access is often expressed through water rights, 
which are agreements about the legitimacy of the right-holders’ claim to water or exclusion 
from it (Boelens & Zwarteveen 2005). Water rights may refer to one or more of the 
following: the right to water (as the resource), the right to infrastructure/technology 
required to transport it, the right to decide its distribution, and the right to decide who 
should have which rights (Boelens & Zwarteveen 2005). 
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In terms of control over water, social power is embedded in water management 
principles, choices of technological systems, and structures of supply, delivery, and 
evacuation of water (Swyngedouw 2009). Globally, as well as in Morocco, the water 
management sector is deeply influenced by the Integrated Water Resource Management 
approach (IWRM, fr. Gestion Intégrée des Ressources en Eau GIRE), which advocates 
demand-driven, rational water management, and encourages privatization and 
marketization of water resources to increase the efficiency and productivity of water use 
(GWP 2000). 
Neoliberal water management 
The theoretical underpinnings of the IWRM approach lie in neoliberalism (Furlong 2010). 
From a neoliberal perspective, water is an increasingly scarce resource because of its 
historic and widespread undervaluation and poor allocation. Therefore, whereas past 
policies aimed at expanding supplies or capturing untapped water sources, current policies 
focus on institutional and legal reforms to effectively allocate water allowing it to be used 
where its productivity is highest (Furlong 2010). These market-based reforms include the 
introduction of private property rights, new technologies, as well as new actors, as case 
studies will demonstrate in the following paragraphs. 
Private water rights are believed to be the main condition for efficient water use 
because they enable treatment of water as a transfearable and marketable economic good 
(Ahlers & Zwarteveen 2009, p. 413). However, problems emerge when policies only take 
into account actors who are recognisable and identifiable in neoliberal terms, often at the 
expense of customary water users who lack formal property rights. Reallocation or 
takeover of water resources already used by local communities is called water grabbing 
(Franco, Mehta & Veldwisch 2013). Research focusing on water grabbing investigates 
how material, discursive, administrative and political power is mobilised to enable water 
reallocation and changes to tenure relations and how this affects local livelihoods and 
social relations. In the Andean countries, for example, the profusion of existing local, long 
established water rights regimes has posed significant challenges to the introduction of a 
universal market system (Boelens 2009). According to Boelens, efforts to “-- align 
‘unreliable’ and ‘unruly’ rights frameworks, and subtly include and domesticate the water 
use communities according to bureaucratic or market needs and images” have yielded 
varied responses; even ‘adopting’ the formal institutions does not necessarily mean 
obeying and conforming to the rules (Boelens 2009, p. 328). 
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Budds (2004) has studied how the adoption of a neoliberal water resources 
management model and introduction of private property rights affected farmers in Chile. 
The 1981 Water Code turned water into a public property over which individuals have use 
rights. The Code recognized existing water rights but in reality, many historic rights have 
not been formalised or recorded at property registries (Budds 2004, p. 327). The small 
number of legal water rights has caused prices to soar making access to groundwater 
highly skewed towards large-scale farmers in terms of both physical exploitation and legal 
registration of water rights. Large-scale farmers are more able and have the resources to 
undertake formalisation processes to which they attach more importance since legalising 
water rights grants access to government subsidies for irrigation development. In 
conclusion, the creation of tradable water rights and government’s commercial export-
oriented agricultural policies have led to significant disparities in access to water between 
large and small-scale farmers: peasant farmers suffer from reduced access to (legal) water 
and increased vulnerability to drought. The privatisation and marketization of water use is 
supported and justified on the grounds of fostering economic development. 
While in Morocco water management is evolving towards privatisation and 
marketization, the subject has attracted surprisingly little interest, mostly within the context 
of aquifer management contracts (in this study groundwater contract, fr. contrat de nappe). 
Hammani et al. (2009) and Faysse et al. (2012) have analysed some of the challenges 
related to introduction of privatisation measures in the form of formal well permits. During 
early 1980s, the state subsidised installation of wells to mitigate the effects of droughts. 
Since the promulgation of the Water Law 10-95 in 1995, however, farmers have needed 
licences for drilling wells. While the work of Hammani et al. showed unawareness of this 
requirement in Tadla (under jurisdiction of Oum Er Rbia river basin agency) (2009, p. 
245), Faysse et al. (2012) provide a short description of well formalisation measures in the 
‘overexploited’ aquifers of Souss-Chtouka (Souss-Massa-Drâa river basin agency), Saiss 
(Sebou agency) and Berrchid (Bouregreg and Chaouia agency). In 2011, the respective 
river basin agencies had surveyed all existing water extraction points (wells and tubewells) 
and requested all farmers to formalise their wells by 2012 and start paying water fees. 
Results were poor: only a few farmers, who wanted to obtain state subsidies for shifting to 
drip irrigation registered their wells, possibly due to unwillingness to pay a groundwater 
use tax. Illegal borehole drilling also continued due to understaffing of authorities (and 
informal consents) (p. 130). 
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The prescription of new technologies as a miracle solution to water scarcity – a 
social construction – has attracted much criticism from political ecologists. The main 
problem is that water issues are often framed, analysed, and addressed in a highly technical 
manner, paying insufficient attention to historical, social and political factors behind them 
(Ahlers & Zwarteveen 2009; Mehta 2007). Framing water issues ‘technical’ justifies 
interventions based on scientific expertise, administrative/bureaucratic reforms, and 
technological measures. As a result, the interventions target symptoms rather than causes, 
ignore existing social practices and relations, and are organised around particular 
narratives and technologies, which in turn contribute to uneven and exclusionary outcomes 
(Budds & Sultana 2013, p. 276). 
Jobbins et al. (2015) studied the effects of drip irrigation adoption from the 
perspective of small farmers in Morocco. Converting to drip irrigation is justified on the 
grounds of water saving and improving production, and the state provides increasingly 
large subsidies of 80%, rising to 100% for farms smaller than 5 ha (p. 396). However, the 
farmers are faced with a complex set of institutional barriers to financing arising from land 
tenure, subsidy and credit system, and administrative requirements (pp. 397-398). To 
access credit, farmers need to provide land acts. Land acts are also required in order to gain 
well permits, which are the criterion for obtaining state subsidies. This excluded many 
farmers with non-private land tenure. Additionally, those who adapted drip irrigation did 
not necessarily reduce their water use: with the help of the technology, some farmers were 
able to increase the irrigated area or even introduce water-intensive crops (p. 401). In 
conclusion, technology alone is unlikely to resolve the issues caused by land tenure 
(ownership regimes, microproperty and land fragmentation), education (literacy, complex 
paperwork) and gender (inheritance law and accessing state services). 
Neoliberal water management reforms also include the introduction of new forms 
of governance, including new actors such as private companies, water users’ associations 
or groundwater contracts, into the management of public services. Decentralisation 
policies can be understood via Foucault’s concept of governmentality (Foucault 1991). 
Governmentality is a form of governance that indirectly controls individuals by rendering 
them ‘responsible’ (Lemke 2002; Shamir 2008). The institutional and legal reforms 
brought about by neoliberalism restructure power relations by transferring and 
decentralising authority and responsibility from the state to sub-state actors. Interpreting 
Foucault, Lemke denotes governmentality as “conduct of conduct”: structuring and 
shaping the field of possible actions of subjects to make them act as they ought to, out of 
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‘free’ will (pp. 52-53). The strategy of ‘responsibilising’ individual subjects and 
collectivities entails shifting the responsibility for social risks, such as unemployment or 
poverty, into individual domain. As the choice of action is an expression of free will, the 
consequences are borne by the subject alone. IWRM advocates claim that decentralisation 
and citizen participation improve transparency and responsiveness of organisations 
resulting in more effective and locally appropriate services (GWP 2000). Critics claim that 
participation is just another form of state control and a transfer of responsibilities and risks 
to water users (Furlong 2010). 
In Morocco, several researchers have analysed the decentralisation policies 
focusing on participative irrigation management and water users’ associations (WUAs) in 
large-scale irrigation schemes, for example (Kadiri et al. 2009; Mathieu, Benali & Aubriot 
2001; Minoia 2012). A minority of studies have focused on small and medium scale 
irrigated perimeters, including (Bekkari & Yépez del Castillo 2011; Keita 2006; Riaux 
2006). While in large-scale irrigation schemes WUAs generally remain weak because the 
enabling conditions - political commitment, financial capacity, and internal democracy - 
are not in place, in small and medium scale irrigation systems they only function for a 
short while in order to receive state subsidies (Kadiri et al. 2009). In sum, the top-down 
implemented projects have mostly not yielded the derired results. 
Nowadays the most pertinent topic in Moroccan water management policies is the 
introduction of groundwater contracts, which are culminations of IWRM policies 
advocating participation, involvement and responsibilisation (AGIRE 2015; Faysse et al. 
2011; Faysse et al. 2012). While the legal context and technical aspects will be covered in 
section Institutional setting, I will now provide a short theoretical background. 
Groundwater contracts are justified on the grounds of Hardin’s tragedy of the (unmanaged) 
commons (1968) and Ostrom’s common pool resource management theory (2002). They 
are a response to uncontrolled groundwater overuse aiming at decentralising water 
management to river basin or aquifer level to effectively involve stakeholders and commit 
them to sustainable water use. Globally, this hasn’t been challenge-free. Mukherji and 
Shah (2005) reviewed groundwater governance institutions in several countries and 
concluded that organisations are often given responsibilities that go beyond their human 
and financial resources, and farmers and other stakeholders are asked to participate in 
aquifer management while their direct interest lies in nonparticipation. Molle pointed out 
the difficulties in finding appropriate governance units that would “unite nature and 
societies” (2006, p. 24). River basins or aquifers rarely correspond to administrative 
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boundaries and often contain heterogenous populations with differing water needs and 
resources. In addition, while IWRM promotes river basin agencies as suitable management 
organisations, as their name reveals, their administrative boundaries are drawn according 
to surface water resources, not groundwater reserves. 
While what happens in export-oriented large-scale irrigation perimeters in 
Morocco’s coastal regions doesn’t necessarily apply directly to oasis conditions dominated 
by small and medium scale perimeters and subsistence farming, the same decentralisation 
policies and technical solutions are proposed and implemented in both contexts. Most 
research on the effects of water management policies has focused on regions and aquifers 
of political or economic importance (for example, all the aquifers belonging to AGIRE are 
located in the principal agricultural areas). Therefore, this study brings out challenges 
related to implementing reforms in a small, marginal oasis in southeast Morocco. 
Table 1 summarizes the theoretical background and connects it to the case study. 
I’ve adopted a more relaxed definition of structures of supply and delivery to include 
organisations as such structures, and understand technological choices as devices, permits 
and infrastructure. To conclude, the theoretical framework of political ecology allows an 
analysis of how social power relations produce differential access to water between social 
groups. Social power is vested in water management institutions and choices of 
technological systems (see Table 1). Institutions, understood as laws, policies, customs and 
organisations, have different origins and sources of legitimization, such as formal state law 
or customary socio-legal systems, and the struggle for the most legitimate one is constant. 
Morocco in engaged in a neoliberal water management agenda, which requires institutional 
and legal reforms to effectively allocate water to be used where its productivity is highest. 
These reforms include the enforcement of formal property rights, new technologies, as 
well as decentralised forms of governance. 
In this thesis, power is understood as a structural difference in access to and control 
over water made visible by differing property rights and water resources as well as 
inclusion into institutions. While water security –availability of and access to adequate, 
reliable quantities of acceptable quality water– is used as a measure of social power 
denoting access to; the adoption or rejection of formal property rights –and other formal 
institutions– demonstrates the degree of change in control over water and land. Analysing 
water scarcity as a combination of natural causes and anthropogenic effects, I will examine 
how the adoption or rejection of state-initiated legal (private property rights), technological 
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(drip irrigation, tap water), and organisational (WUAs) reforms has affected access to and 
control over water. 
Table 1 Framework for analysing social power 
Social power (control over) 
Social power  
(access to) 
Water management institutions 
Technological 
choices 
Rights and resources: 
common-property 
access (khettara, seguia), 
private access (well), 
public access (tap water) 
Water laws and policies 
Water management 
organisations: 
structures of supply 
and delivery 
Legal reforms, formal 
private property rights 
Institutional 
reforms, new actors 
New 
technologies 
Inclusion into 
institutions: adoption or 
rejection, participation 
Water management 
principles: improved 
monitoring, 
decentralisation, 
participation, 
responsibilisation 
ONEP – rational 
water use (tap 
water), WUAs 
Water meters, 
fees, network 
coverage 
ORMVA – 
participatory 
irrigation, rational 
water use, WUAs 
Drip irrigation, 
bypass dams 
ABH –improved 
monitoring, 
groundwater 
contracts 
Well permits, no 
water meters in 
wells 
 
  
  11 
Methodology	  
The overall methodological approach of this study could be characterized as a critical case 
study due to heavy reliance on political ecology literature. The purpose of critical research 
is to uncover non-explicit processes and relations and communicate these in order to 
promote progressive social change (Murray & Overton 2003, p. 21). According to Yin 
(2014), case studies, whether explanatory or descriptive, provide answers to “how” and 
“why” questions, investigation takes place in real-life context and they rely on multiple 
sources of evidence. 
I combined qualitative and quantitative data from both primary and secondary 
sources because triangulation, or combination of diverse methods and data sources may 
increase the validity of research by deepening and broadening the information obtained 
(Longhurst 2003). Mixing quantitative and qualitative methods is not uncommon in 
geography. Collecting data from various sources may reveal contradictions, which would 
otherwise remain unnoticed. 
Methods 
Principal data collection methods in this study were semi-structured interviews and water 
point mapping with a GPS device. Semi-structured interviews were chosen as an 
appropriate method for studying people’s perceptions of water access and availability and 
the aim of water point mapping was to analyse and visualize the spatially differentiated 
water access and availability in the oasis. Besides primary data generated through these 
methods, I also gained access to some unpublished secondary data: statistics on 
groundwater levels, rainfall, river flow (discharge), and municipal tap water. These were 
supplemented with scientific articles and selected online sources such as newspaper 
articles and information on the websites of water and agricultural authorities. 
Semi-­‐structured	  interviews	  
Semi-structured interviews were the most appropriate method for studying people’s 
perceptions of water access and availability for the following reasons. First, they enabled 
gathering information on specific issues but left out space for improvising; each participant 
was addressed a set of predetermined questions, but the order was modified depending on 
the course of the interview. Second, since most of the questions were open-ended, they 
allowed responses in the participants’ own words –or the assistant’s translation of their 
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words. Third, they allowed collection of standardized quantitative and qualitative data 
across the study area to facilitate comparative spatial analysis. 
The interviews were conducted during a period of three months in October-
December 2014 with the help of a research assistant. Interview questions (see Stakeholder 
interview questionnaire) were prepared based on previous research on similar topics, tested 
and discussed with supervisors and NGO personnel and adjusted after the first couple of 
interviews. Each time I approached a new informant for an interview, I provided a short 
description of the aims and purposes of the research project to gain informed consent. 
Some refused to participate but most welcomed me once they heard I was affiliated with a 
local NGO. None of the interviews were recorded since respondents felt uncomfortable 
with audio recordings. 
Research participants were chosen on the basis of their experience with the study 
topic and divided in three broad categories: key informants, stakeholders and experts. Key 
informants and experts were identified based on their status or profession and for 
stakeholders I employed the following criteria: I aimed at interviewing people from 
various positions and backgrounds, such as representatives of different ethnic and age 
groups, preferably also both genders, and most importantly, people with different modes of 
access to water, namely with or without water rights, wells, or tap water connections. 
I used the snowballing technique to identify possible participants and convenience 
sampling or selecting participants on the basis of access. Key informants often walked with 
me from door to door, or field to field, in order to find research participants. Since it was 
the beginning of the farming season, many men were at work in the fields, which on one 
hand permitted me to spot them easily but on the other hand meant that they were often 
busy. 
Both key informant and expert interviews were more like thematic interviews since 
they provided information on water availability, access and livelihoods in general, and the 
respondents often spoke French, which permitted a proper conversation. Stakeholder 
interviews were conducted with the help of a translator and aimed at collecting individual 
perceptions and experiences of water use and availability (see Stakeholder interview 
questionnaire). 
The sample size varies between locations due to availability of assistance (see 
Table 2). In total I conducted more than 50 interviews including the expert interviews with 
water and agricultural authorities and the numerous background interviews with the NGO 
workers. Informal interviews were most often group discussions in which the stakeholder 
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questionnaire form was not utilized but which contributed to general knowledge on the 
study area and research questions. 
Table 2 Summary of interviews per location 
Location 
Stakeholder 
interviews 
Key 
informants 
Informal 
interviews Total 
Ait Assem 12 1 1 14 
Ait M’hamed 7 2 2 11 
Azag N’Ouchene 5 3 3 11 
Bour El Khorbate 10 2 3 15 
Total 34 8 9 51 
 
When I first arrived to a fieldwork area, I initiated contact with one or more key 
informants to familiarize myself with the place. Due to their position in the community, 
they often acted as gatekeepers and helped finding respondents. Key informants were 
village chiefs, water managers (amghars) or influential individuals who could provide 
background information on the socio-ecological conditions of their living environment, 
such as the population or ethnic composition of a village, the number of water right holders 
and households without wells. I was able to interview them several times. 
The next step was stakeholder interviews. In oasis villages, interviewees were 
mostly middle-aged and elderly men whose livelihoods were at least partially related to 
agriculture. The other extreme were commercial plantations and investors whose 
livelihoods depend almost entirely on farming. Men were more readily available to be 
interviewed for cultural reasons: water management, just like all decision-making outside 
the household, is a male business. I did manage to interview a couple of female 
stakeholders because I insisted that women are just as important as water users and since 
water uses are gendered, men and women might experience scarcity differently. 
Expert interviews were conducted in the final phase of the fieldwork in December 
2014 because I wanted to be well prepared. Formal letters of recommendation were 
necessary to gain access to water and agricultural authorities. The interview themes varied 
depending on the respondent: I interviewed representatives of Agence du Bassin 
Hydraulique du Guir-Ziz-Rhéris (on water resources management and monitoring, dams), 
Office Régional de Mise en Valeur Agricole Tafilalet (irrigation water and infrastructure), 
and Office National de l’Eau Potable Tinjdad (tap water provision). While I call these 
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water and agricultural authorities experts, it does not mean their knowledge is more 
legitimate than stakeholders’. It is merely a reference to their position as law and policy 
implementors and service providers. 
GPS	  water	  point	  mapping	  
Geographical Information Systems (GIS) are organized collections of data-processing 
methods, which enable understanding and visualizing patterns in spatial data (Batty 2003). 
The aim of water point mapping was to analyse and visualize the spatially differentiated 
water access and availability across the oasis. Locations of wells and khettaras were 
measured with a GPS device together with the stakeholders after completing the interviews 
during which I collected the qualitative and quantitative water point characteristics. 
Data and analysis 
Data quality and comprehensiveness varies between and within fieldwork sites. It was not 
always possible to conduct the interviews in calm, private environments to guarantee 
unbiased responses. Many times they actually took place in public space –such as in the 
middle of a road– with the presence of several people. Respondents were often busy and 
more than once I could not complete the whole questionnaire but had to limit the 
discussion to bare essentials. 
Gaining information on the water situation and changes in water availability proved 
extremely challenging, since water consumption is not measured in volumes, except for in 
the case of tap water, but in time and debits –for both khettaras and motored wells. 
Irrigated areas also vary according to season (crop water needs) and water availability and 
therefore respondents couldn’t provide explicit answers to how much water they use and 
need. They could estimate the actual water situation and when the water sources had run 
dry. That is why I had to rely on secondary data. While collecting secondary data is 
standard practice for doing fieldwork in developing countries, even official data may not 
be truthful or valid and official statistics may suffer from suspect data collection 
techniques, ill-informed analysis or even deliberate tampering (Overton & van Diermen 
2003, p. 42). 
All secondary data had some deficiencies such as many missing values, missing 
metadata, missing references or lack of most recent figures. Despite the inaccuracies and 
deficiencies I still decided to refer to these data as indicative to give some perspective to 
my results. A slight setback was not being able to gain information on the wells operating 
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in Ferkla oasis. Registration of wells exceeding a certain depth or withdrawal capacity is 
compulsory and the authority responsible for it is ABH. Despite an agreement, I never 
received any estimate or official figures of the current situation. 
I started analysing the research materials already during the course of the 
interviews, when the respondents’ answers brought up new issues and research themes I 
hadn’t considered. This way, the approach is both theory and data-driven. I employed 
qualitative content analysis to study what was being said about the research questions by 
organising the materials into themes, types and cases (Saaranen-Kauppinen & Puusniekka 
2006). Each fieldwork area became a case representing different water conditions and 
demonstrating certain aspects of the issues related to water availability and access. 
Due to the limited sample of GIS data, I will only discuss the findings and publish 
maps of general level to ensure participants’ anonymity (and avoid harm since many of the 
water points are unauthorized). I was unable to construct a comprehensive data set 
covering the whole study area and had to abandon the idea of proper spatial analysis such 
as interpolating the water data. 
Constraints and ethical issues 
Major constraints in realizing this study were language issues and general lack of research 
experience with their concomitant consequences. I set out to Morocco without speaking 
any Arabic except for thank you and Insh’Allah, God willing (indeed!). Although I knew 
that knowledge of local languages would have enabled richer data and greater 
opportunities of interaction with locals, I trusted to find a good assistant with the help of 
the NGO. 
I had several research assistants of various skills and knowledges during the 
fieldwork, all of which were men. Having a male assistant counterbalanced the fact that I 
was a young woman conducting fieldwork alone but it also prevented me from engaging 
more with female respondents. Interviewing women was problematic since in some 
villages talking to strangers, especially men, was deemed unacceptable for women. 
Due to linguistic issues (very few interviewees spoke adequate French and my 
research assistants couldn’t accompany me every day) I couldn’t conduct research daily. 
Instead, I visited each fieldwork area a few times with my assistants and tried to observe as 
much as I could alongside the interviews. This and my insistence on studying multiple 
cases instead of focusing on only one location resulted in slightly superficial data. Yet I 
claim that it was a good approach as an introduction into the multiple realities of 
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contemporary oasis life. In addition, while I worried a great deal about having enough 
respondents, in qualitative research it is not the sheer number or ‘representativeness’ of 
people approached which matters, but the quality and positionality of the information they 
can offer (Crang & Cook 2007, p. 14). I believe my sample has enough variation in terms 
of positionality of the informants. 
My interest in locating the wells caused some suspicion: understandably giving out 
detailed information on unauthorized or otherwise questionable water points is risky. In the 
beginning of each interview, I explained I was going to ask questions on livelihoods and 
water use and would like to take a look at their water points. I also asked several attribute 
questions, which may have felt intrusive but was necessary to be able to proportion the 
information and compare water access and availability according to the entitlements. 
Sometimes I felt that the most sensitive question was asking people’s names. I 
would have felt bizarre asking many detailed questions without knowing people’s names, 
while they clearly exchanged that information with my assistant. However, I promised they 
would not be identifiable and no harm would come from sharing information. 
During the research project I followed the principles of ethical research practice: 
respecting the autonomy of research subjects, avoiding harm, and protecting privacy and 
data (TENK 2009). I conducted a systematic analysis of as comprehensive data as I could 
get and present the results in an unprejudiced and balanced manner. 
I had permission to conduct research from the local gendarme.  
  17 
Study	  area	  
Ferkla is an oasis located in southeast Morocco, across three municipalities called Ferkla 
El Oulia (FEO), Ferkla Essoufla (FES) and Tinjdad (also Tinejdad) (TIN) in the province 
of Errachidia. Also referred to as Afrekla, it is situated in between two larger and more 
water abundant oases: Tinghir to the west and Goulmima to the northeast. The oases have 
been formed around watercourses on an otherwise barren plain surrounded by mountains: 
High Atlas in the north and Anti-Atlas in the south (see Figure 1). Historically, people 
have lived in mudbrick forts, ksour (ksar singular form), surrounded by palm groves. In the 
course of the years, the older ones have outgrown their historical centres and new ones 
have been built especially around the national highway. Some thirty to fourty such villages 
are dispersed across Ferkla according to ancient (and current) water availability. 
 
Figure 1 Map of Ferkla oasis 
The physical setting can be described as challenging with a semi-arid climate 
characterised by a long, hot dry season and a cool winter coupled with considerable spatial 
and temporal irregularity in rainfall (see section Physical water availability for more 
information). Only 1,5 % of the study area is cultivated and irrigated and the rest consists 
of sandy and stony plains dominated by low-growing drought-resistant shrubs (CMV 
2005). 
According to the typification of de Haas (2001), there are two types of oases in 
Ferkla: river oases and groundwater oases. River oases consist of several small oasis 
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villages located on the banks of a river. They use surface water for irrigation: inhabitants 
build and maintain small dams to divert water into the irrigation network or seguia1. 
Groundwater oases access water with khettaras, gravitational systems for mobilizing 
groundwater consisting of an underground canal and aeration wells Figure 2. The division 
into river oases and groundwater oases is not rigid: a combination of different water-
accessing techniques is common and more and more inhabitants rely on tap water and 
wells equipped with motorpumps in both settlement types. Additionally, as the study will 
reveal, most villages in Ferkla have originally been river oases built next to a perennial 
watercourse but as surface water availability has weakened, they have resorted to using 
groundwater. 
 
Figure 2 Khettara irrigation system 
Originally, khettaras weren’t very long and they derived their water from shallow 
layers of ground; therefore it has been necessary to constantly prolong and deepen them to 
maintain a proper water flow (Brahim et al. 2013). While the debit has always depended on 
both physical and anthropogenic factors affecting groundwater availability, without any 
other force than gravity, khettaras have not been able to deplete groundwater reserves. 
They only provide water at the same rate as the aquifer recharges. Because of their 
ingenious design and socio-cultural importance, they are held in high esteem. 
                                                
 
1 Irrigation canals are sometimes referred to as seguias (in Arabic) and as targuas (in Tamazight) but in this 
study seguia will refer to canals using surface water and khettara to canals using groundwater. 
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Each oasis village has an irrigated palm grove (tamazirt) where villagers grow date 
palms and cultivate subsistence crops. Outside the irrigated perimeters are communal 
rainfed lands (bour) and further away communal pastures extending to a maximum 
distance a herd can walk during one day and still return home before nightfall. Land used 
to be the fundamental source of wealth and power because land and water ownership 
defined the family’s position in the society: only landed lineages had – and still have – a 
representative in the village council jmaâ. Ethnographic research has revealed sharp ethnic 
divisions and hierarchical relations in Moroccan oases: dominant ethnic groups have 
subjected others into landlessness and slavery (de Haas 1998; Ilahiane 2001a). There have 
also been schisms between the sedentarised populations and the nomads, and wars between 
neighbouring ksour over water and land provisions. Nowadays there are still tensions 
between social groups, as this study will demonstrate. 
The region has long been a sending area of national and international migration, 
with seasonal migration beginning in the 1950s and 1960s towards other regions of 
Morocco and Algeria, and since 1970s to Spain and France (de Haas 1998; de Haas 2006). 
Migrants, who for the most part had been landless agricultural workers, invested their 
remittances in land and became landowners, or started small businesses. The driving forces 
of migration were droughts and population growth; remittances provided the inhabitants 
with the means and resources of dealing with water scarcity, which together with 
abandonment of transhumanism permanently changed the oasis by diversifying livelihoods 
and lifestyles (key informant interview November 2014). 
Table 3 Population in 2004 
Municipality Population Households 
Ferkla El Oulia 20100 3000 
Ferkla Essoufla 12600 1700 
Tinjdad 7500 1300 
Total 40200 6000 
Source: Royaume du Maroc 2004 
 
According to 2004 national census, there were approximately 40200 people or 
6000 households in the study area, the most populous and largest municipality being 
Ferkla El Oulia, where all the fieldwork areas are situated (Table 3). 2014 census statistics 
were not available. Fieldwork showed that majority of villages in Ferkla Essoufla are 
Arabic, whereas in Ferkla El Oulia the principal language is Tamazight, one of the three 
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berber dialects in Morocco. Back in 2004, the most important sources of revenue were 
construction and public works, agriculture, and commerce (Royaume du Maroc 2004). 
Even though the importance of agriculture as a source of revenue has declined, majority of 
people living in oasis villages and especially women cultivate subsistence crops and 
vegetables for household consumption and occasionally for sale at the local market. 
Fieldwork areas 
Based on previous studies, water availability and modes of access to water vary greatly in 
different locations across the Ferkla oasis (Kabiri 2005). Three zones can be distinguished 
in relation to groundwater availability: upstream, centre and downstream, along the river 
Ferkla2. The upstream zone, entirely consisting of Bour El Khorbate, is characterised by 
individual wells and motorpumps, the centre from Ait Assem to downtown Tinjdad by 
seguias and individual wells, and the downstream towards Goulmima by khettaras. South 
of Tinjdad, the villages along the river Toughachte also employ khettaras. 
Fieldwork areas were selected on the basis of modes of access to water. Azag 
N’Ouchene, Ait M’hamed and Ait Assem were selected as examples of common-property 
access via traditional irrigation infrastructure such as a khettara or seguia, and Bour El 
Khorbate as an example of private access via wells or tubewells. In the following sections I 
will provide short background descriptions of the fieldwork areas and a summary of 
interviewees both based on interview results. In Table 4 taggourt is the measure for 
customary water rights and occupation refers to principal sources of livelihood during 
working career; many of the older interviewees had already retired. Day labourers are 
short-time agricultural workers (fr. journalier). 
Ait	  Assem	  
Ait Assem is an ancient ksar built towards the 14th century in the centre of the oasis Ferkla. 
Until the 1960s and 70s the old ksar stood surrounded by a lush palm grove. The 
inhabitants of the river oasis derived their irrigation water from the river Ferkla and 
irrigated their palm grove with the help of an irrigation canal or seguia network.   
                                                
 
2 The names of municipalities also reveal this division with oulia meaning priority or primary and essoufla 
down or lower, hence upstream and downstream river Ferkla. River Todgha is called Ferkla when it reaches 
the oasis. 
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Table 4 Stakeholder characteristics 
Location Age Gender Taggourt Area (ha) Migration Occupation* 
Ait Assem 
 
42 m 4 0,64 x Construction, farmer 
46 m 1 0,25 n Shopkeeper 
48 m 3 0,25 x Herbalist 
52 m 2,5 1 x Construction 
58 f 0 0,25 n Farmer, housewife 
65 m 1,5 0,16 x 
Construction, day 
laborer 
65 m 1,5 0,16 x Construction 
70 m 1 1,44 n Day laborer 
70 f 2,5 0,4 n Farmer, housewife 
70 f 5 1,44 n Farmer, housewife 
73 m 0 0 x 
Construction, day 
laborer 
83 m 2 0,64 n Farmer 
Ait M’hamed 
 
30 m 0 1,5 x Technician, farmer 
32 f 2 2 n Farmer, housewife 
50 f 0,5 0,5 n 
Farmer, herder, 
housewife 
58 m 0,16 2 x Multiple, farmer 
71 m 2 2,5 x Multiple, farmer 
80 f 2 2 n Farmer 
85 m 0,16 2 x Construction, farmer 
Azag N'Ouchene 
 
26 m 1 0,3 n Farmer 
39 m 2 3,5 x Construction, farmer 
40 f 0 0 n Herder, housewife 
41 m 0,16 0,002 x Construction 
82 m 1,5 0,36 n Farmer 
Bour El Khorbate 
 
24 m n 8 n Farmer 
24 m n 4,5 n Farmer 
27 m n 3 n Farmer 
47 m n 20 x Farmer 
57 m n 7 n Farmer 
60 m n 10 x Day laborer, farmer 
60 m n 5 x Farmer 
67 m n 15 x Multiple 
72 m n 6 x Construction, farmer 
90 m n 7 x Construction, farmer 
m=male, f=female, x= yes, n=none, -=unknown 
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After prolonged droughts and drying up of the river, common lands around the ksar were 
divided and many sold their share at a cheap price in the 1970s before the land value began 
to rise as more and more people started buying land next to the main road. 
Nowadays, the population of Ait Assem is somewhere around 10000. Main sources 
of livelihood have shifted from agriculture to construction and services; out of 12 
interviewees six had migrated in search of livelihoods during the 1970s and only a few of 
the interviewees actually cultivate their lands due to lack of water (three women and two 
men) (see Table 4). In fact, one interviewee explained that even if he wanted to, he 
couldn’t afford to pay for a tractor to do the tillage. Those who cultivate, plant alfalfa 
(fodder) for their domestic animals and try to keep their date palms alive with the limited 
surface water available during floods. 
Except for a couple of (former) sharecroppers who had only bought land to build a 
house, all interviewees owned agricultural land in the palm grove and had a water right 
(see Table 4). In Ait Assem, land and water rights can be sold separately which has caused 
differences in the number of water rights and land possessions between farmers. 
Ait	  M’hamed	  
The village of Ait M’hamed was established some 150 years ago by nomads on the banks 
of a small river ten kilometres south of modern-day Tinjdad. When the river run dry, the 
inhabitants dug khettaras. Water availability was good until the 1960s and 70s; the 
khettara provided enough water to irrigate the whole palm grove and the villagers enjoyed 
alimentary self-sufficiency. Population growth (nowadays approximately 100 households) 
and insufficiency of water provided by the khettara forced people to extend agriculture 
outside the palm grove and introduce alternative water sources, private wells. Many have 
also migrated in search of livelihoods, the last herd was sold ten years ago and primary 
production is no longer the principal source of revenue in Ait M’hamed. 
Unlike in Ait Assem, many villagers still maintain their parcels with the traditional 
water tour irrigation system. When water is scarce, people only grow alfalfa and dates; 
when water is more plentiful they plant vegetables for sale at the weekly market. However, 
the economic importance of those plots is small in comparison to the agricultural 
extensions outside the palm grove. Majority of villagers are customary water right holders 
but some newcomers who have bought land from the extensions or only for their house do 
not have water rights. All interviewees, however, did have (see Table 4). Except for two 
younger interviewees in their 30s, the rest were in their 50s, 70s and 80s. All the men had 
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worked elsewhere in Morocco and their children had also left the village (except for the 
youngest). The three female interviewees had not migrated for work. 
Azag	  N’Ouchene	  
Azag N’Ouchene is a remote village 20 kilometres northwest from Tinjdad, where some of 
the inhabitants still earn their living from sheep and camel herding. According to a key 
informant who knew the 2014 census figures, Azag N’Ouchene has a population of 190 
households of which 130 are sedentarised and 60 nomadic. The village was established in 
the 1950s when nomads requested a place to settle down and constructed a khettara to 
satisfy their agricultural and domestic water needs. Due to its remote location and higher 
altitude, the village has no tap water and for the last few summers the municipality of 
Ferkla El Oulia has been forced to supply emergency drinking water as the khettara and 
wells have dried up. Villagers are desperate to improve their water situation but ethnic 
tensions and power struggles are making land and well registrations impossible. 
There are both water rightless inhabitants (some nomads and a few sharecroppers) 
and customary water right holders in Azag N’Ouchene (see Table 4). The people I 
interviewed had parcels varying from 6m x 300m (0,18 ha) to 30m x 100m (0,3 ha) and 
40m x 800m (3,2 ha). Alfalfa, dates and wheat are cultivated for household consumption 
only; agriculture is nobody’s sole source of livelihood. Each interviewee had either worked 
elsewhere or had a family member sending money home. During harvest times, even 
women work as paid agricultural day labourers outside the village. No one from Azag 
N’Ouchene has ever migrated abroad. Interviewees were around 40 years old except for 
one younger and one older man. 
Bour	  El	  Khorbate	  
Bour El Khorbate is an area specialised in commercial agriculture upstream river Ferkla. 
Bour means uncultivated, rainfed land and these former common grazing lands used to 
belong to the inhabitants of Ksar El Khorbate. Series of droughts led to drying up of 
perennial rivers and traditional irrigation infrastructure. Locals resorted to dividing and 
selling the common lands to investors who, with remittance money, turned them into 
flourishing plantations irrigated with groundwater. First motored pumps were introduced in 
the mid 1970s and the area was highly productive until the next serious drought in the 
early 1980s; those who could, deepened their wells progressively as the water table fell but 
those without the means of doing so were forced to sell and leave. Nowadays the area is 
the principal target of agricultural development interventions. 
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The interviewees in Bour El Khorbate were either investors, most often from 
Tinghir, who had arrived in the 1970s, or inhabitants of Ksar El Khorbate who had bought 
more land. All except for the three younger ones had worked elsewhere in Morocco or 
even abroad in their youth to earn enough money to buy land and settle down. Their adult 
children had either migrated, some abroad, or were working on the estate (men). 
The investors’ livelihood depends almost entirely on their agribusiness. Two out of 
ten occupied less than five hectares and were struggling to make ends meet. The average 
farm size of the sample was eight hectares in Bour El Khorbate in comparison to two in Ait 
M’hamed and less than one in Ait Assem and Azag N’Ouchene (Table 4). The investors 
cultivate cash crops such as dates, olives, fruits and vegetables, and raise sheep for sale. 
Since Bour El Khorbate is an agricultural extension area, there are no customary water 
rights to exploit. All of the interviewees belong to the water user group of water rightless 
large-scale landowners3 relying on individual private water access.  
                                                
 
 3 Although some of them are from Ksar El Khorbate and have hereditary water rights, which they haven’t 
been able to exploit due to lack of water. 
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Institutional	  setting	  
Institutions, understood as laws, policies, customs and organisations, are the structures 
defining access to and control over water and land. They have different origins and sources 
of legitimization, such as formal state law or customary socio-legal systems, and the 
struggle for the most legitimate one is constant (Ahlers & Zwarteveen 2009). In Morocco, 
laws governing land and water uses are a combination of customary law, Islamic law, 
French legislation and Moroccan formal state law (Doukkali 2005; Word Bank 2008). In 
Ferkla, people abide by both customary and formal law; according to customary law, 
access to land and water is expressed through rights, taggourt for water right, whereas the 
state law requires property formalization and well authorisations to recognize private 
property rights. 
In the long run, the principal trend in land and water management has been a 
transfer of power from local inhabitants to government authorities and an erosion of 
traditional institutions. Morocco’s adoption of the Integrated Water Resources 
Management (IWRM) approach has caused a wave of decentralizing water management by 
creating new institutions. However, water users’ associations (WUAs) and formal property 
rights have not filled the institutional vacuums caused by weakened customary institutions 
and increase in private irrigation. The preparation of groundwater contracts is also only in 
the beginning: during fieldwork in fall 2014 authorities had not yet conducted water 
extraction point surveys. 
At first I’ll review the relevant formal laws and policies and present the water and 
agricultural authorities after which I’ll describe the current state of the customary socio-
legal system in Ferkla oasis. The review of formal laws and policies is done on the basis of 
information available online. The sections describing the situation in the study area are 
based on interview results and materials obtained from water and agricultural authorities. 
Formal legal and policy framework governing water and land 
The formal basis of Moroccan water management is the Water Law 10-95 (Royaume du 
Maroc 1995). Adopted in 1995, the law states that all waters belong to the state and the 
management and allocation of water resources should be based on cooperation between 
water users and public authorities. The overarching goal is to integrate and coordinate the 
management of all water resources with the creation of nine river basin agencies (fr. 
Agence du Bassin Hydraulique ABH) (see Figure 3). According to the law, each river basin 
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agency is expected to compile an integrated river basin development plan (fr. un plan 
directeur d'aménagement intégré du bassin hydraulique), which then serve as the basis for 
a national water plan or strategy (fr. plan/stratégie national de l’eau). 
 
Figure 3 Map of Moroccan regions and river basins 
Morocco is currently in the process of refining its water laws and policies, 
particularly those governing groundwater use with the aim of creating aquifer 4 
management contracts (hereafter groundwater contract, fr. contrat de nappe). The 
contracts, essentially regional strategies for water resource management, are agreements 
                                                
 
4 Aquifer is an underground layer of water-bearing permeable rock or other materials, which contains 
groundwater. I’ve translated the word nappe as a groundwater reserve because it means water stored in an 
aquifer. 
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between all local stakeholders (policy makers, managers and users) sharing the same water 
source. In 2014, such contracts were planned or in progress for approximately 30 aquifers, 
two in the province of Errachidia (Royaume du Maroc 2014). Priority is given on the basis 
of hydrological balance and the rate of overexploitation. The contents of the contracts are 
yet to be defined but the aim is to include stakeholders more in water use monitoring. 
Another important national policy guiding water resource management is the Green 
Morocco Plan (fr. Plan Maroc Vert), a national development strategy introduced in 2008 
for modernizing the agricultural sector. It consists of two pillars: modern intensive 
agriculture with high value crops in ares of high agricultural potential (irrigated and 
favourable bour zones) and small-scale farming in marginal zones (mountainous, oasis and 
defavourable bour zones) (ADA 2013). Water saving is an important part of the Green 
Morocco Plan. In large-scale irrigated perimeters this mainly means conversion from 
surface or sprinkler into localized irrigation. In small and medium scale perimeters 
authorities encourage participatory irrigation management to responsibilise water users and 
increase the valuation of water (MAF 2014). This means introduction of water users’ 
associations. 
The major effects and consequences of these laws and policies are decentralization 
of water management and responsbilisation of water users by creating water users’ 
associations, promoting water-saving irrigation technology and encouraging property 
formalization which translates into well authorization requirements justified on the 
grounds of improved hydrological data and water use monitoring. Articles 26, 27 and 38 of 
the Water Law 10-95 summarize the information (see Royaume du Maroc 1995 for official 
French): 
Article 26 Every property owner may, without authorization, dig wells or drill tubewells on 
their land not exceeding the threshold depth set by regulations. 
Article 27 Every groundwater extraction point existing on the date of publication of this 
law shall, within a period fixed by regulations, be subject to declaration. For unauthorized 
water extraction points this declaration is an authorization request. 
Article 38: Authorisation is required for all groundwater extraction points exceeding the 
threshold depth or debit set by regulations. 
The ambiguity of the law leaves room for interpretation: article 26 allows a 
proprietor to dig wells without authorisation as long as they are shallow, while articles 27 
and 38 require all wells to be authorised, even the shallow ones. According to a key 
informant, until recently, authorisations were not required for any wells –old or new ones– 
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but since Morocco started revising its water law, the policy has changed and every well 
owner throughout the country is supposed to declare their wells (interview November 
2014). Even though the law has existed since 1995, the first deadline for declaring illegal 
water points was in 2013 and the second in 2015 (Royaume du Maroc 2014). According to 
officials, declaring wells protects the rights of the proprietors and also helps authorities in 
making an inventory of wells (Royaume du Maroc 2014). 
In practice, well authorisation requires an official land ownership act and defines 
the average annual water debit to be used, the maximum hourly rate and the size of the 
irrigated area (ABHBC 2013). A commission consisting of both ABH and ORMVA 
employees makes an on-site inspection and ensures that the new well will not affect 
existing groundwater extraction infrastructure such as other (legal) wells or khettaras by 
establishing a buffer zone of 300 meters. To obtain a land act, in addition to an 
authorisation provided by the village council, detailed topographic surveys are required to 
define the property limits and the registration costs money (ANCFCC 2013). Property 
taxes will also have to be paid. In the past, obtaining an ownership document (moulkiya) 
was much simpler: one needed 12 witnesses, who could prove that the person had owned 
the land for more than ten years (Word Bank 2008, pp. 15-16). The law also applies to 
khettaras or seguias: customary water rights via common property infrastructure are 
recognized as long as the infrastructures are registered along with the right-holders. 
Formal	  water	  management	  organisations	  in	  Ferkla	  
The formal organisations responsible for water management in the study area are the river 
basin agency Agence du Bassin Hydraulique de Guir-Ziz-Rhéris (ABH-GZR), the national 
drinking water provider Office National de l’Eau Potable (ONEP), and the regional 
agricultural authority Office Régional de Mise en Valeur Agricole Tafilalet (ORMVA-TF). 
Ministry of Interior and municipalities also hold responsibilities but I did not interview 
their representatives. These formal state organisations have gradually replaced the 
customary water management institutions. 
Established in 2010, ABH-GZR is responsible for the design and implementation 
of integrated water management plans, as well as management and control of water use 
including delivery of well authorisations. It manages four catchment areas: the rivers Guir, 
Ziz, Rhéris (also Ghéris) and Maider, which stretch over several provinces and 
municipalities (see Figure 3). It is the only one of the formal institutions with a mandate to 
protect the water resources and balance the demands of socio-economic development with 
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water availability. During the fieldwork in 2014, ABH-GZR had not conducted surveys on 
existing water extraction points and the well declaration period was still ongoing. The 
preparations for groundwater contracts were far behind the coastal areas. 
ONEP Tinjdad has gradually taken over potable water production and distribution 
from the municipalities since its establishment in 1996. Part of a national electricity and 
water provision company Office National de l'Électricité et de l'Eau potable (ONEE), 
ONEP has managed the national rural drinking water provision program (fr. le Programme 
d’Approvisionnement Groupé en Eau Potable en Zones Rurales PAGER) since 2004 
(Royaume du Maroc 2015). This program creates water users’ associations for drinking 
water provision in rural areas. There aren’t any such associations yet in Ferkla. 
ORMVA Tafilalet or the regional agricultural development authority was created in 
1966 to manage rural development, especially irrigation and agricultural production 
(Royaume du Maroc 2011). Working under the jurisdiction of Ministry of Agriculture and 
Fishing, ORMVA is in charge of implementing the Green Morocco Plan and consequently 
mainly concerned with larger scale irrigated perimeters and commercial agriculture. In 
traditional oases and palm groves, ORMVA’s role is mainly related to khettara or seguia 
rehabilitation. ORMVA is also responsible for the creation, renewal and equipment of 
collective groundwater pumping stations, dams and agricultural water users’ associations 
(ORMVA-TF 2011). 
Customary water and land management 
While it is outside the scope of this study to present the water and land management 
practices under the traditional socio-legal system in detail, as have done for example 
Ilahiane (1996), Lightfoot (1996), de Haas (2005) and Brahim et al. (2013), I will describe 
the basic functions and current situation of these institutions in the fieldwork sites 
according to interview results. 
When oasis societies were predominantly agrarian, the whole social order was 
based on the strict organisation of land and water management. Village council (fr. le 
groupement ethnique) or jmaâ was the institution responsible for governing water and land 
use with special responsibilities reserved for the chief of the village council (amghar) and 
chief of the irrigation system (amghar n’waman). With a representative of each landed 
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lineage or fraction5, the village council was in charge of all water-related rights leading the 
allocation of water and land use rights, division of irrigation tours, maintenance of 
hydraulic infrastructure (khettara or seguia), and conflict resolution. Each right holder was 
assigned a timeslot in the irrigation timetable managed by the amghar n’waman and any 
deviation from the rules, for example overuse of water, was punished. Social control was 
strict and the village council governed almost all aspects of everyday life from closing the 
ksar gates at nightfall to setting up harvesting schedules (Ilahiane 2001b). 
Originally the water rights were proportional to the workforce provided for the 
construction of the khettara or seguia. For example, in Ait M’hamed providing one 
labourer working full time guaranteed one taggourt for the whole family (and eventually 
lineage or fraction). Taggourt is a measure of irrigation time; the length varies according to 
number of right-holders sharing the water. Land was allocated on the basis of workforce: 
each family received the maximum amount of land they could cultivate and parcels were 
periodically reallocated between right holders to ensure a fair access to land. Ta’achrit, a 
tenth, tells the size and number of parcels in the irrigated perimeters. Those villages with 
functioning khettaras such as Azag N’Ouchene and Ait M’hamed still abide by the 
customary laws of water management but not those of land management: cultivated land in 
palm groves (tamazirt) and rainfed areas (bour) have mostly been permanently divided 
between right holders and their descendants, the latter resulting in areas called the 
extensions. The fate of communal pastures was less clear. Nearby villages often claim to 
have rights over same lands. 
With the division and privatisation of land and the introduction of government 
agencies, the roles and responsibilities of village councils have been greatly reduced. 
According to my interviewees, in addition to solving small, local land or water disputes, 
the jmaâ mostly makes decisions concerning state aids, such as applying for khettara 
rehabilitation funds or medicine for livestock. Furthermore, the village councils have no 
authority over water use outside the palm grove: in the extensions villagers (and investors) 
with motored wells can use all the water they can, whenever they want, instead of waiting 
for their irrigation tour. Bour El Khorbate is an example of this. The village council of 
Ksar El Khorbate controlled the bour until they divided and sold the lands to investors. 
                                                
 
5 Lineage refers to a group of people with a common ancestor. Water rights were originally granted to the 
founding families, whose descendants have inherited them. Fractions (irs in Tamazight, adma in Arabic) are 
interest groups under the patronage of an influential person. Members may belong to different lineages and 
ethnic groups. 
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Since then, water management in the area has been an individual responsibility resulting in 
a situation of ‘unmanaged commons’ and state intervention. 
The total number of taggourts, length of the irrigation times and size of the parcels 
vary between villages. In Azag N’Ouchene there are 110 taggourts with one corresponding 
to approximately three hours of irrigation water every 12 days. Land is divided into 
ta’achrits, which are 10-meter-wide strips extending from the main irrigation canal into the 
riverbed. One ta’achrit equals to 10 taggourts. The palm grove has 44 ta’achrits, which 
were originally divided between the 11 fractions based on their working capacity: Ait 
Lekoursi and Ait Masri were and are still the most populous groups and possess 2 
ta’achrits of land (equals to 20 taggourts), while the rest each have one ta’achrit to share 
between the right holders. Permanent land division outside the palm grove in 1994 was not 
done on the basis of workforce: it was done on the basis of the previous division to the 
benefit of the already wealthy (in terms of land) families. My interviewees explained that 
availability of land or the size of the parcels is not a problem in Azag N’Ouchene, the 
availability of water is. 
In Ait M’hamed, irrigation water is divided into 16 taggourts, 15 for the fractions 
and one for the mosque. I was told that the 15 founding families, or the original right-
holders, needed help with the maintenance of the khettara and progressively extended 
water rights to allies forming fractions. Currently one taggourt equals to 12 hours of 
khettara water every eight days; many families possess one half or even an eighth. 
Common lands were permanently divided already in the 1940s or 50s on the basis of 
taggourts, not on the basis of people or workforce thus underpinning the power of the 
already powerful families. 
More than in any other fieldwork area, in Ait M’hamed the question of land 
fragmentation as a result of inheritance rules provoked interesting discussions. Originally 
each right holder was allocated land in three different zones of the palm grove to ensure a 
fair land division and water access. With a limited khettara debit, it was impossible to 
irrigate them all. Therefore inhabitants dug wells in the parcels furthest away from the 
khettara basin (1-1,5 km distance). As a result of inheritance rules, many are left with a 
couple of small, dispersed parcels and thirty minutes of water. I asked members of the 
village council whether the parcels could be rearranged to create larger entities and make 
irrigation more efficient but they rejected the idea because of tenure issues (some have 
official land acts while others do not) and variability of value and profitability of land. 
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In Ait Assem, water was divided into 300 taggourts each fraction possessing 25 of 
them. In terms of land, one taggourt corresponds to 100 m2 or 10 m x 10 m. However, the 
irrigation system has not been in active use since the drying up of the river Ferkla: water 
only flows in the seguias during floods. My interviewees complained that the village 
council has passivated due to lack of younger, more educated members and the palm grove 
is not taken care of.  
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Physical	  water	  availability	  
While the aim of this thesis is to describe socio-political perspectives of water scarcity, it is 
necessary to provide some background data on the hydrological features of the oasis. This 
section will assess how water availability has varied in the study area. The water resources 
can be divided into surface and groundwater. Naturally all water flows according to the 
hydrological cycle and both surface and groundwater resources are recharged with 
precipitations. 
The study area has a semi-arid climate characterised by considerable spatial and 
temporal irregularity in rainfall. Different weather stations register slightly different 
amounts of rainfall: ORMVA-TF statistics from Tinjdad give an annual average rainfall of 
120 mm, whereas ABH-GZR data from Merroutcha station five kilometers northeast of 
Tinjdad has an annual average of 105 mm (Figure 4). Stations situated in the High Atlas 
Mountains (Tamtetoucht and Tadighoust) receive more rainfall than stations situated in the 
plain (Merroutcha and Tinjdad) (see appendix Rainfall statistics). Rainfall in the mountains 
contributes to river flows: Todgha-Ferkla, which is the most important river running 
through the oasis, has its source in the High Atlas mountains. 
 
Figure 4 Annual precipitation sums (mm) (Sources: ABH-GZR, ORMVA-TF 
December 2014) 
Several months may pass without any rain, for example during the agricultural years 
(September-August) of 1980-1985, nine to ten months out of twelve were completely dry. 
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The last five years have also had more completely dry months than humid ones and annual 
precipitation sums have been alarmingly low except for the massive peak of November 
2014 (Tinjdad 102,5 mm) and another from March-April 2012 (82 and 50 mm 
respectively). No clear cycles can be distinguished. 
Less recent data from ABH-GZR shows the number of days when water was 
flowing in the river Todgha reaching Ferkla during 1985-2008 (Table 5). To facilitate 
reading, months with at least one day of water flow (average debit >0 m3/s) have been 
marked with gray colour. Most floods –since the river is dry, any water flow is considered 
a flood– have occurred in October, November and September while the driest months have 
been July and January. 
Table 5 Number of days with average river flow debit > 0 m3/s at Merroutcha station 
YEAR SE
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C
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D
E
C
 
JA
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FE
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M
A
R
 
A
PR
 
M
A
Y
 
JU
N
 
JU
L
 
A
U
G
 
TOTAL 
85-86 n 2 3 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 12 
86-87 2 15 0 0 0 0 5 0 3 2 0 0 27 
87-88 2 11 9 6 0 9 6 0 0 0 0 0 43 
88-89 0 9 16 5 0 5 0 0 0 8 0 9 52 
89-90 10 5 29 5 0 0 1 5 5 0 0 0 60 
90-91 5 5 0 11 3 0 10 11 7 7 0 9 68 
91-92 11 2 0 11 0 0 0 2 4 5 3 0 38 
92-93 0 0 2 2 3 11 0 0 0 0 0 1 19 
93-94 5 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 25 
94-95 0 13 3 0 0 0 3 11 0 3 0 1 34 
95-96 0 15 0 0 0 15 3 0 0 14 5 0 52 
96-97 0 3 0 0 11 0 2 14 0 0 0 3 33 
97-98 16 2 0 0 0 5 3 0 0 2 0 0 28 
98-99 9 14 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 6 31 
99-00 3 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 16 
00-01 0 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 17 
01-02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 11 3 0 0 0 14 
02-03 12 0 0 0 0 0 5 0 0 2 0 9 28 
03-04 13 18 0 0 0 5 0 6 6 3 0 2 53 
04-05 4 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 12 
05-06 2 2 8 4 1 10 0 0 5 6 3 0 41 
06-07 4 5 4 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 
07-08 0 2 0 0 0 5 0 2 2 0 0 2 13 
Source: ABH-GZR December 2014 
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Agricultural years with more than 30 days of water flow up to 68 days have been 
marked with darkening shades of gray indicating more frequent occurrence. During late 
1980s and early 1990s there were more days and months with water flow than later on. 
While the total debits are unknown, the occurrence of floods decreased 1985-2008. Fewer 
floods means less aquifer recharge by infiltration and less irrigation water for those using 
surface water. 
Comparing precipitations with flood data from the agricultural years 05-06, 06-07 
and 07-08 one can see that each year the precipitation sums amounted up to 150-200 mm 
while floods only occurred on 41, 16 and 13 days (see Figure 4 and Table 5). Nearly 
equally large amounts of precipitations resulted in a varied number of days with a 
discharge > 0 m3/s meaning that the floods were more intense. Besides managing absolute 
shortages, people have to be prepared for excess. 
 
Figure 5 Groundwater reserves of Errachidia province 
  36 
Hydrogeographically, the study area belongs to the river basin of Rhéris (see Figure 
5): Todgha-Ferkla is the most important tributary of Rhéris with an annual discharge of 36 
million cubic meters of water (ABH-GZR interview December 2014). On a dry year, the 
discharge may sink to less than 5 million m3. Nevertheless, before reaching Ferkla, the 
river flows through the oasis of Tinghir where it dries up leaving no water for the 
inhabitants downstream except for during floods. All the rivers passing through Ferkla –
Tangarfa, Satt and Toughachte– have been dry for the last 30 years except for in times of 
flash floods. 
Groundwater availability 
Ferkla has a shallow quaternary6 groundwater reserve called the aquifer of Tinjdad (fr. 
nappe de Tinjdad) extending to an area of approximately 90 km2 with a width varying 
between 1-4 kilometers and an approximate length of 25 kilometers (marked as the 
quaternary aquifer in Figure 5) (ABH-GZR 2009). The depth of the quaternary aquifer 
varies between 15 and 30 meters and the thickest part is located around Ferkla and Satt in 
the central oasis (see Figure 6). Its annual renouvable volume is between 6-10 million 
cubic meters (m3) while the annual withdrawals for irrigation and drinking water amount 
up to circa 18 million cubic meters, which means that the water balance is negative (ABH-
GZR interview December 2014). The rest of the oasis draws groundwater from a 
cretaceous7 aquifer (north) hydrated by runoff waters from the High Atlas Mountains or, 
down south, from infiltrated runoff waters from the Anti-Atlas Mountains (Figure 6). The 
southern parts of Ferkla El Oulia do not have a solid aquifer like the central oasis but the 
ground has fissures, which contain water. 
                                                
 
6 Quaternary aquifers are geological layers that were formed during the last 2,6 million years. 
7 Cretaceous aquifer refers to layers that were formed 145-66 millions of years ago. 
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Figure 6 Geological north-south cross-section of Ferkla 
Longitudinal analysis of groundwater levels in ABH-GZR surveillance wells 
complements the precipitation data in describing physical water availability. Figure 7 
presents a combination of surface and groundwater data (precipitations from ORMVA-TF 
and groundwater from ABH-GZR December 2014). Annual average groundwater levels 
were calculated on the basis of available monthly measurements. Total annual precipitation 
data corresponds to agricultural years (from September to August). Fortunately, ABH had 
surveillance wells in two of the fieldwork areas, Ait Assem and Ksar El Khorbate, the 
latter just downstream from Bour El Khorbate. The surveillance well in Ait Assem 
represents the water situation in the quaternary aquifer. 
 
Figure 7 Average groundwater levels and annual rainfall 
The figure shows large fluctuations in the groundwater levels during 1980s and 1990s both 
within and outside the quaternary aquifer. During the review period, the groundwater table 
has fallen from 10 meters below ground in 1976 to 15-25 meters below ground in the 
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2000s. Unfortunately, no figures were available for the last few years. The fluctuations are 
clearer in figures presenting the exact measurements from individual wells situated in four 
different locations: 1 Ksar El Khorbate, 2 Ait Assem (quaternary), 3 Gardmit (quaternary) 
and 4 Izilf (see Figure 8). The wells form a diagonal cross-section of the central oasis. 
 
Figure 8 Locations of ABH surveillance wells 
The first surveillance well is situated in Ksar El Khorbate just downstream from Bour El 
Khorbate Figure 9. Actual measurements are marked with square symbols: those intervals 
without them are missing values, not periods of stability. Important annual fluctuations 
characterise the whole measurement period 1976-2009 but general trend is downwards. 
The weak rainfall of early 1980s and the introduction of motored wells in Bour El 
Khorbate contributed into a drop in groundwater levels. 
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Figure 9 Groundwater levels in Ksar El Khorbate 1976-2009 (Source: ABH-GZR 
December 2014) 
The drop is visible in all wells except for nro 4 in Izilf and most dramatic in Ait Assem, 
approximately 3 kilometers downstream (northeast) from Ksar El Khorbate Figure 10. 
Recovery was as swift as the fall; the frequent floods in the late 1980s must have had an 
effect. After 1996 until 2005, there are more missing values than actual measurements. 
 
Figure 10 Groundwater levels in Ait Assem 1976-2005 (Source: ABH-GZR December 
2014) 
Three kilometres northeast from Ait Assem is Gardmit, where according to data from the 
ABH surveillance well, the water table has even began to rise after the dramatic fall in the 
1980s, which permanenly lowered the water level Figure 11. Unfortunately latest figures 
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are missing so it remains unknown whether this trend continued after 2011 or not. 
Additionally the data has a long gap in 1998-2006. This surveillance wells also measures 
the situation of the quaternary aquifer. 
 
Figure 11 Groundwater levels in Gardmit 1976-2011 (Source: ABH-GZR December 
2014) 
Six kilometers northeast from Gardmit is the surveillance well of Izilf, which has 
registered far less dramatic falls in water levels but the data shows continuous annual and 
seasonal fluctuations Figure 12. Also, while the last measured groundwater levels in other 
surveillance wells were around 20 meters below ground, in Izilf they are much higher, 
around 10 meters. The same higher groundwater level also continued in the surveillance 
wells east of Izilf (in Mellaab). 
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Figure 12 Groundwater levels in Izilf 1973-2009 (Source: ABH-GZR December 2014) 
What these figures demonstrate is the differing availability of groundwater in 
various sections of the central oasis and the large variations in the depth of the water table 
in different aquifers. Geological facts, such as permeability and water-bearing abilities of 
the soil and the depth (or thickness) of the aquifer, affect the availability of groundwater. 
While the groundwater reserves are recharged with rainfall and floods, in the long run the 
recharge rate has been lower than the withdrawal rate, as the changing groundwater levels 
in surveillance wells have shown. ABH-GZR estimated the annual renouvable volume of 
the quaternary aquifer between 6-10 million cubic meters (m3) in comparison to the annual 
withdrawals of up to 18 million m3. Simply put, that would results in a rate of exploitation 
of 180-300 %.  
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Access	  to	  waters	  across	  the	  oasis	  
Access to water depends on the actual and historic water use and distribution practices, 
including the different norms and discourses user groups refer to when claiming access 
(Ahlers & Zwarteveen 2009). In this section I will review how access to waters varies 
around the oasis based on fieldwork results and secondary data from ONEP and ORMVA-
TF. Following Mehta’s division of modes of water access (2007), I divided the water 
infrastructure into three categories: common property access (khettara or seguia), private 
access (motorised well) and state-backed provision (ONEP tap water). First I will discuss 
each mode of access individually and then provide an overview of the stakeholders’ water 
access according to user groups formed on the basis of their rights and resources. 
Khettaras provide agricultural and household water in Azag N’Ouchene and Ait 
M’hamed. In Bour El Khorbate, investors rely on individual wells; there is no common 
property hydro-infrastructure available except for a seguia managed by a WUA. Both Bour 
El Khorbate and Azag N’Ouchene lack state-provisioned tap water services, whereas Ait 
M’hamed and Ait Assem are almost fully covered. In Ait Assem, households’ principal 
mode of access is tap water, since the river and most wells have dried up. In Azag 
N’Ouchene and Ait M’hamed, the individual access via wells is complementing the 
common property access via khettara. 
Khettara and seguia –common property access 
26 out of 56 known khettaras still provide water for household use and agriculture in 
Ferkla oasis according to an estimate provided by ORMVA-TF (see Table 6 and Table 7). 
Surprisingly many khettaras had remained functional 2005-2014; ORMVA-TF employees 
only removed three from the list obtained from their report dated 2005 (CMV 2005). 
Majority of khettaras had exhausted well before that. 
Most of the working khettaras are situated in Ferkla Essoufla (20/31), in the north 
and northeastern parts of the oasis; they are replenished by water flowing from the High 
Atlas Mountains. In Ferkla El Oulia, the remaining khettaras (6/25) are all, except for the 
one in Azag N’Ouchene, situated along river Toughachte, which flows down from the 
Anti-Atlas Mountains. In Ferkla El Oulia, the 25 khettaras used to provide water to more 
than 4800 households (CMV 2005). The remaining ones serve approximately 300 
households, which is less than ten percent of the original amount. In Ferkla Essoufla, 
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slightly over a thousand households out of 3500 have lost their common-property water 
source. 
Table 6 Functioning khettaras and seguias in Ferkla El Oulia 
Name/ Location Irrigated area (ha) 
Irrigated 
area (ha)* 
Debit 
(l/s) 
Right holders 
(households) 
Ihandar 30 6 8,53 8 
Ait M’hamed 20 8 7 70 
Ait Said 18 0 4 42 
Taghia 10 4,5 7,4 56 
Taghouchte 6 3,5 4,76 38 
Azag N'Ouchene 5 3 4 100 
Sources: ORMVA-TF 2014/ CMV 2005, *= Aoutoul, Belghiti & Abane 2005, 
measures from January 2005 
 
Table 7 Functioning khettaras and seguias in Ferkla Essoufla 
Name/ Location Irrigated area (ha) 
Irrigated 
area (ha)* 
Debit 
(l/s) 
Right holders 
(households) 
Laksiba 26 9 6,8 100 
Bakassia 20 20 19,6 200 
Ait Oulghem 20 12 10 39 
Maamrya 20 8 8,8 153 
El Moch 16 2,5 2 435 
Tighfert 15 20 8,55 195 
Litama 15 15 7,5 65 
Dar oumira jdida 14 10 6,97 80 
Ami Hassan 14 9 6,7 75 
Cheikh 13 4 11 112 
Ait Ben Omar 10 20 9,6 135 
Mouyjna 10 8 7,2 54 
Diba 10 9 3,6 154 
Atti Kaida 8 4 5,95 95 
Regaga 8 6 4 50 
Ait My El Mamoun 7 10 4,6 70 
Khamsine 6 2 1,2 60 
Dar oumira 5 8 1,6 34 
Ikhf N'ighir 1 - 0,64 32 
Tamagourte 0,6 2 1,16 150 
”-” =no information, Sources: ORMVA-TF 2014/ CMV 2005, *= Aoutoul, 
Belghiti & Abane 2005, measures from January 2005 
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Information on khettara water debits and irrigated areas was hard to obtain due to 
lack of measurements and seasonal variations. The tables provide some figures from the 
early 2000: to demonstrate seasonal and annual variability, I have included measurements 
from a study conducted by CMV 712 Tinjdad, a subdivision of ORMVA-TF, and a 2005 
study by Moroccan students assisted by ORMVA-TF. Both assessments of the irrigated 
area are dated 2005 but variations are remarkable, for example the irrigated area of Ait 
M’hamed has diminished from 20 hectares to 8 and in Azag N’Ouchene from 5 ha to 3 
(see Table 6). Based on rough measurements on Google Earth Pro, the irrigated area of the 
palm grove in Ait M’hamed was circa 4 hectares (200m x 200m) of denser vegetation 
around the khettara basin and a total of 13 hectares of dispersed vegetation around the 
palm grove (image from July 2013). Understandably there is less vegetation during the dry 
summer months but in Azag N’Ouchene the same method resulted in 15 hectares of 
vegetation (image also from July 2013). Therefore, it’s likely that most of the figures 
presented in the official statistics are estimates, not actual measurements. 
In general, the remaining khettara have a very weak debit whenever groundwater 
levels fall due to lack of rainfall, which happens every summer according to inhabitants. I 
did not have the equipment to measure actual water debits, so I rely on stakeholders’ and 
my own visual assessment of water availability. I visited Azag N’Ouchene right after the 
November 2014 floods and saw the khettara overflowing with water. There was even 
water in the river passing by the village. In Ait M’hamed, I was lucky enough to see both 
before and after flood situations and the difference in the khettara debit was noticeable. 
In Azag N’Ouchene, the khettara provides agricultural and household water for a 
100 households with water use rights (CMV 2005). My interviewees, however, claimed 
that out of 190 households, only one, 10 or 20 households are not ayants-droit. The 1-20 
households who do not have water rights are mainly sharecroppers or nomads who don’t 
have a permanent place of residence and who access water via cattle wells built by 
ORMVA-TF. In any case, households without water rights are allowed to use the common 
water for domestic purposes, since the right to drinking water is inalienable. While men 
mostly take care of irrigation, women use the water for cooking, cleaning, washing and 
drinking. Water for drinking and cooking is fetched upstream or from the basin. Laundry is 
done downstream to avoid polluting the water with detergent. Some 50 households’ only 
water source is the khettara; those who can, use water from household wells (either draw 
wells or motorised) for domestic uses and khettara water for irrigation. 
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Azag N’Ouchene is divided in two by a river. Khettara water is used for irrigating 
the palm grove on the southern side, where most people live. The north side of the river, 
the first extensions, is not connected to the irrigation network; the options are either a 
private well or fetching water from the khettara basin on the other side of the riverbed. 
One of the interviewees had participated in the construction of the khettara in the 
1960s. He told that the khettara’s debit has always been dependent on precipitations; there 
has never been permanently enough water. Water availability improves during wintertime 
when it rains but in the summer the flow dries up. In times of drought, khettara water is 
supplemented with wells in the palm grove. For the last few summers, the municipality has 
had to bring drinking water with trucks. 
Since the khettara is not an ancient one, it has been covered with concrete since the 
beginning (1965) to minimise infiltration and water losses. The state financed the khettara 
with ‘chumur’ (fr. chômage, unemployment) program funds to help sedentarise mobile 
populations (nomads). It has been maintained and renovated with villagers’ and ORMVA-
TF funding. The floods of November 2014 damaged the khettara and the villagers were 
applying for funds to repair the damages and also to improve water availability by 
constructing a small dam upstream. Because the ground is hard and rocky, the villagers 
didn’t have the finances to implement the project themselves. In fact, the funding for all 
improvement works comes from external sources and the water users only take care of 
simple maintenance works. 
In Ait M’hamed, most villagers have all three modes of water access available: the 
individual access via wells, common property access via khettara and state-provisioned tap 
water. Just like in Azag N’Ouchene, khettara water is used for both agricultural and 
domestic purposes but water security in Ait M’hamed is better due to tap water 
availability: there is no risk of running completely out of water. However, among 
interviewees tap water wasn’t a popular water source. A female interviewee told me that in 
her family both people and domestic animals drink well water, and khettara water is used 
for laundry and irrigation. Another one said his family only uses tap water when they must 
because khettara water is of excellent quality. 
In dry periods, the khettara debit is greatly reduced; a phenomenon worsened by 
motorpumps upstream the khettara, a clear violation of customary khettara protection 
laws. In 2001, the residents appealed to local and provincial authorities and the illegal 
pumping was stopped for a while resulting in noticeable improvement of the debit. Now 
the investors continue pumping again ‘in secret’ –the greenery is the evidence. Many date 
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palms, an important source of revenue, have died in Ait M’hamed because of water 
scarcity. The situation is delicate since, as the village chief explained, people cannot be 
stopped from digging wells because they need water to survive. Still, the village council of 
Ait M’hamed has requested state funds to extend the khettara upstream once again in 
search of water, although the aeriation wells are already nine meters deep and the head of 
the khettara has almost reached the neighbouring oasis. 
I discussed the issues related to khettara maintenance and rehabilitation with 
ORMVA-TF personnel. They said that khettara debits can be improved by prolonging 
them, deepening them or by adding extra tunnels to capture water. The biggest challenge is 
the groundwater level: if it falls below the level of the basin, the khettara cannot be revived 
by deepening the abduction gallery, because water will not flow upwards against gravity. 
In these situations the only solutions are to wait and see if the groundwater level rises 
again, or move the basin to be able to restore water flow. Moving the basin is rare because 
it means abandoning some of the irrigated parcels. 
In Ait Assem, the palm grove used to be irrigated with three seguias but nowadays 
only one of them is usable. The principal seguia was rehabilitated and coated with concrete 
in early 2000s by ORMVA-TF and the Ministry of Interior but my interviewees claimed 
that the work was not carefully executed. In the absence of rains and irrigators, the seguia 
is not maintained properly and metal parts are stolen and sold. 
Well –individual access 
On the basis of the previous section describing the uncertain access to water using 
common property infrastructure, it is clear why so many have resorted to private wells. 
There are two types of wells being used in Ferkla: wells and tubewells (fr. forage). Wells 
are mostly shallow (under 40 meters deep, mostly about 20) and often manually dug. 
Tubewells on the other hand are at least 40 meters deep and consist of a pipe that has been 
drilled into the aquifer. 
The results of the water point characteristics mapping indicate large variations in 
terms of access to groundwater via individual wells. Numbers of wells, their depth and the 
groundwater levels vary greatly between and even within the fieldwork sites (see Table 8). 
I surveyed Bour El Khorbate before the November floods (20. –24.11.2014) and the rest of 
the fieldwork sites after the floods. Sample size tells how many wells the statistics are 
based on. It is not the same as the number of stakeholders since some stakeholders had 
several wells while some had none, and I also surveyed some wells belonging to informal 
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interviewees and key informants. Average groundwater level and the range refer to the 
prevailing situation at the time of the interviews, not the annual average or its fluctuations. 
Dry wells were included in the calculations and their water level was marked as one meter 
deeper than their depth. 
Table 8 Groundwater statistics 
Fieldwork site 
Average 
well depth 
(m) 
Range 
[min-max] 
depth (m) 
Average 
groundwater 
level (m) 
Range 
[min-max] 
gwl (m) 
Sample 
size 
Bour El Khorbate 53,1 20-130 25,2 14-45 28 
Azag N’Ouchene 14,2 11-17 9,7 5-13 7 
Ait Assem 28,16 20-38 26,8 21-38 6 
Ait M’hamed 33,28 19-80 17,57 13-25 7 
 
On average, interviewees in Ait Assem and Azag N’Ouchene had one well, while 
in Ait M’hamed they had two and in Bour El Khorbate three. In oasis villages in general, 
each household has one functioning well; they have been progressively deepened or 
abandoned according to water availability and the owner’s financial situation. Only in 
Bour El Khorbate majority of investors (8/10) had several functioning wells. However, 
most functioning wells only provide water for limited periods of time or are completely 
exhausted in the absence of floods. Nonetheless, I identified a couple of wells, which 
continued to offer adequate quantities of water throughout the year. These were all situated 
in Bour El Khorbate. 
In Ait Assem, 9 out of 12 interviewees had a well, and 6 out of 9 were working, 
barely, according to my interviewees. Most were old, from the 1940s and 1970s. I 
surveyed six wells and only one of them had adequately water: the 33-meter well has been 
in use since the 1940s and the proprietary shares the water with her neighbours requiring 
only the price of gas (motor works with gas). Even this well had dried up in the summer of 
2014, which tells of important fluctuations in groundwater levels. Ait Assem had the 
deepest wells and groundwater levels with the average well depth reaching 26,8 meters 
below ground. Majority had abandoned their dry wells and relied on rainfall and floods for 
irrigation and tap water for domestic needs. There weren’t any tubewells in Ait Assem. 
In Azag N’Ouchene, almost all sedentarised households have a well to supplement 
khettara water. Essentially, wells provide water for drinking and other domestic needs; 
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additionally, there are also 10-15 wells in the palm grove to safeguard sufficient irrigation 
water during dry periods. Villagers do not restrict construction of wells except for 
upstream of khettara. Azag N’Ouchene had the shallowest wells and highest groundwater 
table with an average depth of 9,7 meters. However, all the wells have run dry for the last 
few summers, which means the groundwater table seasonally falls below 17 meters 
underground. The interviewees explained that to improve the water situation, they would 
like to dig deeper wells but they do not have enough money to invest in drilling. Majority 
of the surveyed wells had been dug in 1965 and a couple during 1990s. 
In Ait M’hamed, there are more than a 100 wells located in living compounds, the 
palm grove and the extensions. The first well was dug during the 1970s. Majority of them 
are 20-40 meters deep, with the exception of a couple of 80-meter-deep tubewells. In the 
palm grove, the wells provide extra water in times of drought but in the extensions 
motored wells are the only water source. Because of running costs8 (fuel for the engine), 
the extensions are reserved for commercial crops and the palm grove with free9 khettara 
water for subsistence farming. During the interviews, the water situation was quickly 
improving as a result of floods, and all the wells, which had been nearly dry for months, 
were reviving. The average groundwater level had risen to 17 meters below ground while it 
had been well below 20 meters. 
In Bour El Khorbate, the average well depth of the sample reached 53 meters below 
ground with a range from 20 to 130 meters; 13 out of 28 wells were at least 40 meters deep 
tubewells. Without the tubewells the average well depth was 31,8 meters. Even though the 
investors had the deepest tubewells, the groundwater level was actually higher –even 
before the floods– than in Ait Assem: the average groundwater level was 25,2 meters 
below ground with the deepest groundwater level reaching 45 meters and shallowest 14 
meters. Some out of the surveyed wells were from 1970s but most had been dug after 
2000, especially after 2010. Majority of the newest wells were tubewells. 
Interviewees explained changes in groundwater availability by intensive use of 
motorpumps for irrigation and lack of rainfall. In every fieldwork area, the groundwater 
level used to be higher and finding water was easy. Nowadays the water table has fallen to 
the level of, or even below, the schists, an impermeable layer at the bottom of the aquifer. 
                                                
 
8 Depending on the motor, one large gas bottle à 40 dirhams keeps the pump working for three to four hours. 
Some motors run on electricity, some on diesel or petrol. 
9 Right-holders either pay for smaller maintenance tasks such as canal clearance works (50-70 dirhams per 
day per labourer) or do it themselves. No water fees are collected. 
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People speculate on the availability of a deeper water layer far below the schists but 
accessing that water would require drilling a very deep and expensive tubewell. 
When I asked how the proprietaries had chosen the locations of their wells, they 
explained that proximity of a watercourse was an important factor because of the 
groundwater-replenishing effect of floods. No one had information on the actual 
hydrogeological situation: they employed a water dowser who could locate water using 
traditional methods such as olive tree branches or metal rods. Only one interviewee had 
had a technician help him locate his wells. Mislocating a well is an expensive mistake. 
Tap water –state-provisioned access 
Subsidised household tap water connections were introduced in early 2000 in Ferkla El 
Oulia and in 2006 in Ferkla Essoufla. Before the installation of household connections, 
each village had a communal standpipe (fr. borne-fontaine) limited to the provision of 
household water. Naturally those who could drew potable water from their own wells or 
khettara. The price of a subsidized household connection was 2500 DH whereas now the 
full cost is about 8000 DH depending on the location and size of the house. 
 
Figure 13 ONEP Tinjdad tap water connections since 1996 (Source: 
ONEP Tinjdad December 2014) 
The amount of connected households, administrative buildings and industries has more 
than tripled in less than twenty years. According to ONEP Tinjdad, the total number of tap 
water customers under their jurisdiction in the end of year 2014 was 9569 (Figure 13) out 
of which 2373 were served by rural water supply.  
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The potable water 
distribution network has five 
branches or antennae delivering 
water into several villages (see 
Figure 14). Water use was only 
measured as total consumption 
per branch: there was no data 
according to exact location and 
no reliable data on urban water 
provision (it was not measured 
per branch like rural water 
consumption). Due to a recent 
switch from paper filing into 
computerized data processing, 
precise consumption figures were only available since 2012 preventing longitudinal water 
consumption review.	  
Table 9 shows the total annual rural water consumption 2012-2014 (except for the 
last quarter of 2014). There seems to be a small but steady rise in the tap water use of rural 
villages. However, the data doesn’t tell whether this is because of a rise in the number of 
consumers, a general rise in water use or an actual conversion from other water sources to 
tap water due to water shortage. 
Table 9 Quarterly rural water consumption 2012-2014 
Table 10 shows how average consumption per customer varied seasonally in the 
rural branches during the first three quarters of 2014. As temperatures rose towards the 
summer and the dry season, so did water consumption. The number of clients, absolute 
quantities used and the average consumption were highest in branch 2, which provides 
water to several semi-urban agglomerations on the north side of river Ferkla. The lowest 
Quarter/ 
Year 
T1  
(Jan-Mar) 
T2  
(Apr-Jun) 
T3 ( 
Jul-Sep) 
T4  
(Oct-Dec) 
2012 23825 38926 55257 34799 
2013 29032 43376 56377 39632 
2014 30186 47199 60072 n 
Source: ONEP Tinjdad December 2014 
 
Antenna 2: Zaouiet Sidi Lhouari, 
Ait Maamar akdim, Qtaa El 
Oued, Tighfert, Talalet, Tayar-
za, Laksiba, Ait Ben Omar, Dar 
Oumira
Antenna 3: Ait Moulay El Ma-
moun, Ait Ba Maati, Tizgaghine, 
(Sahb, Khettarat N’Oughroud, El 
Guelta)
Antenna 4: Izilf
Antenna 1: Ait M’hamed, 
Khettarat Imaloune 1 & 2, 
Ihandar, Taghya, Taghouchte, 
Ait Said
Urban
Figure 14 Potable water distribution network 
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levels of consumptions were found along branches 1 and 4, the former serving small, rural 
villages in the Anti-Atlas Mountains, many of which have functioning khettaras. 
Interestingly, the branch 3 that serves ksour with multiple functioning khettaras has quite a 
high number of customers whose average water consumption in 2014 was almost the same 
as in branch 2. 
Table 10 Seasonal rural water consumption in 2014 
 
T1 (Jan-Mar) T2 (Apr-Jun) T3 (Jul-Sep) 
Rural 
branch Cust. Cons. Avr. Cust. Cons. Avr. Cust. Cons. Avr. 
1 171 1853 10,84 174 3280 18,85 178 3698 20,78 
2 1270 17021 13,40 1276 26177 20,51 1280 33564 26,22 
3 698 8805 12,61 700 14173 20,25 700 17737 25,34 
4 214 2507 11,71 214 3569 16,68 215 5073 23,60 
Total 2353 30186 12,83 2364 47199 19,97 2373 60072 25,31 
Cust. = Customers, Cons.=Consumption (m3), Avr. =Average 
Source: ONEP Tinjdad December 2014 
 
ONEP household water pricing is progressive: the higher the volume consumed, 
the higher the price per cubic metre (see Table 11). Majority of local consumers belong to 
the lowest two billing categories. There have been several cases of customers not being 
able to pay their water bills due to lack of finances. ONEP prices, set centrally, are the 
same throughout the country, and do not consider variations in environmental conditions 
nor in the ability of local populations to pay (interview ONEP Tinjdad December 2014). 
Table 11 Potable water pricing in 2014 
Price DH/m3 Consumption m3/month 
Consumption  
m3/3 months 
Number of 
consumers 
2,37 <6 <18 3992 
7,39 6-12 18-36 2610 
7,39 12-20 36-60 1743 
10,98 20-35 60-105 694 
11,03 >35 105-1000 98 
  Total 9137 Souce: ONEP Tinjdad December 2014 
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Lack of rainfall and growing demand are putting a strain on drinking water 
resources. Until now, the ONEP wells10 (three or four 100-meter-deep tubewells) have 
never run dry but in the summer 2014 a drought alert was raised to limit consumption. 
Current consumption levels are already high in comparison to network capacity: the pipe 
diameters are too narrow to handle an increasing demand (interview ONEP December 
2014). 
Another possible threat to drinking water security are commercial farms using the 
same aquifer for irrigation water. ONEP officials denied this threat claiming that their 
wells have adequate buffer zones. However, alternative water resources are needed to 
avoid resource depletion. Timkit dam up river Tangarfa was launched in 2009 to improve 
and secure drinking water provision in Goulmima and Tinjdad. It was supposed to be 
operational before 2015 but is still not due to construction problems. If it had been 
functioning during the floods of November 2014, the stocks would have improved the 
water security for the next years (interview ONEP December 2014). 
As for the tap water situation of the fieldwork areas, two of them, Ait Assem and 
Ait M’hamed, are connected to tap water provision network but the other two, Azag 
N’Ouchene and Bour El Khorbate, are not. In the first two, majority of households have an 
individual water connection, in Ait Assem since mid-1980s (urban branch) and in Ait 
M’hamed for the last few years (rural branch 1). Tapless households exist but nobody 
knows the exact figure. All the people I interviewed had household connections. 
Azag N’Ouchene and Bour El Khorbate are outside the tap water provision 
network. For the most part, the investors in Bour El Khorbate did not miss tap water since 
they often lived elsewhere within the scope of services or were content with drinking well 
water. Two interviewees had problems with water quality (too acid to drink) and wished 
for some kind of intervention since they actually lived on their farms. In Azag N’Ouchene, 
the isolation and higher altitude have prevented the normal network connection until now. 
According to ONEP, both areas will be provided tap water but instead of 
transferring water all the way from Goulmima, they will use local wells and establish 
drinking water users’ associations to take care of water provision and payments. In Azag 
N’Ouchene, the ultimate responsibility will lie within the village council. ONEP 
                                                
 
10	  ONEP wells are situated in Goulmima, a water-rich oasis 20 kilometres northeast of Tinjdad and supply 
drinking water to several municipalities.	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interviewees claimed that an association can provide drinking water with a more affordable 
price but expressed doubt of the project’s viability, especially regarding the inhabitants’ 
ability to manage the system and most of all, pay for the water (interview December 2014). 
Access to water according to user groups 
Before moving forward to analysing the effects of laws and policies, I will provide an 
overview of water security (adequacy, reliability, quality) according to the user groups. 
The principal division was made between small- and large-scale farmers because of 
fundamental differences in terms of livelihoods and availables modes of access between 
the traditional palm groves and the commercial agricultural extensions. Looking from 
water rights perspective, this division also separates those who have customary water 
rights (common property access) and those who don’t (individual private water access) 
with the exception of some water rightless inhabitants in the oasis villages. 
Table 12 shows a classification of small-scale farmers’ water security on the basis 
of reliability, adequacy and quality of their modes of access to water (khettara/seguia, 
working wells and tubewells, tap). Data is principally sorted according to how many 
modes of access they employ and how reliable, adequate and safe the water sources are. 
The colour-coded table shows quite clearly that within the group of small-scale farmers, 
access to water is best secured with a combination of multiple assets and that very few rely 
only on a single water source (1 person had tap water access only and 1 khettara access 
only).  
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Table 12 Small-scale farmers' water access 
Water 
user Taggourt Parcels 
Land area 
(ha) 
Wells 
(working/ 
total) 
Tubewells 
(working/ 
total) 
ONEP 
AZ 0 0 0 0 0 n 
AZ 0,16 1 0,002 0 0 n 
AA 0 0 0 0 0 x 
AZ 1 2 0,3 1/1 0 n 
AZ 1,5 2 0,36 1/1 0 n 
AZ 2 3 0,3 1/1 0 n 
AA 1 12 1,44 0/1 0 x 
AA 1,5 4 0,16 0 0 x 
AA 2 8 0,64 0/1 0 x 
AA 2,5 10 1 0 0 x 
AA 5 12 1,44 0/1 0 x 
AA 0 5 0,25 1/1 0 x 
AM 0 2 1,5 1/1 0 x 
AA 1 5 0,25 1/1 0 x 
AA 1,5 4 0,16 1/1 0 x 
AA 2,5 11 0,4 1/1 0 x 
AA 3 5 0,25 1/2 0 x 
AA 4 8 0,64 1/2 0 x 
AM 0,5 3 0,5 1/1 0 x 
AM 0,16 2 2 2/2 0 x 
AM 0,16 3 2 3/3 0 x 
AM 2 4 2 1/1 2/2 x 
AM 2 4 2 1/1 2/2 x 
AM 2 6 2,5 1/1 2/2 x 
n=no, x=yes AA=Ait Assem, AM= Ait M’hamed, AZ= Azag N’Ouchene 
0 water sources 3 (khettara, well, tap) 
1 source (khettara or tap) 4 (khettara, wells, tap) 
2 (khettara+tap/well; tap+well) 5 (khettara, well, tubewells, tap) 
 
The worst off in terms of water security – availability of and/or accessibility to 
adequate, reliable quantities of acceptable quality water – are the water rightless and 
landless households in Azag N’Ouchene. However, while they may nominally lack all 
modes of access, in practice they make informal arrangements with other villagers to 
secure an access to water. I interviewed a woman, whose family had recently settled down 
in the village and she explained that they accessed irrigation water through a sharecropping 
agreement with a villager, whose water right they used. Since they didn’t have a well, the 
woman fetched daily approximately 25 liters of water from the khettara basin; even water 
rightless villagers are allowed to use common water for household needs. Since there is no 
state-provisioned public tap water available in Azag N’Ouchene, that family basically 
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relied on khettara water only. She was happy with the quality of the water but like all 
inhabitants in the village, her family suffered from water scarcity during the summer 
months. 
In fact, as the previous sections describing water availability have shown, khettaras 
and especially seguias are not reliable sources of water. With the exception of one person, 
all other common property users had at least one other mode of access to water: either the 
state-provisioned public tap water or a private well. Looking at the table, one can see that 
having only 2 water sources instead of 3 is actually not a result of free choice: in Ait 
Assem, this was mostly because of drying up of the wells and in Azag N’Ouchene because 
of unavailability of tap water. The table shows that half the stakeholders in Ait Assem have 
working wells while the other half survives with seguia and tap water. Keeping in mind the 
rarity of floods, those stakeholders actually live on tap water. 
Purely looking at the capacity of a water source to provide adequate, reliable 
quantities of acceptable quality water, tap water proved a very secure source. However, 
from the stakeholders’ perspective, especially in Ait Assem, where relying on tap water 
was often the case, the interviewees did not perceive their water situation as secure because 
they lacked access to customary amounts: they didn’t have irrigation water to take care of 
their land and date palms. 
Tap water was often seen as a pricey but secure mode of access. This is why I have 
given it a higher value in the table in comparison to khettara/seguia or private well. The 
inhabitants were divided in two in terms of tap water quality: some were fine, while others 
complained about the taste. All inhabitants had stored a few containers filled with potable 
water in case of rupture in water supply, which happened occasionally. Tap water supply 
isn’t rationed but the progressive, volumetric charging does disencourage excessive 
consumption. Tap water was also deemed far too expensive for irrigation. 
Even when there is water in the khettara, having a water right doesn’t necessarily 
guarantee convenient or safe water access. In Azag N’Ouchene, several of my stakeholders 
lived outside the reach of the irrigation network. While all of them were water right 
holders, they had been forced to dig wells to draw domestic water and irrigate their kitchen 
gardens. The alternative would have been walking to the khettara basin and carrying water 
home. Inhabitants living on the south side of the river within the reach of the irrigation 
network also preferred to draw drinking water from domestic wells because by the time 
water reaches their homes it has been contaminated with mud (because of irrigators and 
dirt in the canals) and detergent (women doing laundry). 
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While the khettara of Ait M’hamed has been able to provide a miminal water flow 
even during the driest months thus guaranteeing some water security, the small water flow 
combined with short irrigation turns has reduced its value as an irrigation water source in 
comparison to private wells. Still, many interviewees listed khettara as the best water 
source because it provides free, good-quality water. One respondent explained that 
khettara water is better than well or tap water because of its lightness; it awakens her 
appetite. Another female interviewee said that khettara water is more pleasant to handle, 
for example while doing laundry in the winter, because it is less cold than tap water. ONEP 
only provides cold water; each household may warm their water up with a gas heater. 
The best water security situation according to this classification is found in Ait 
M’hamed where all modes of access (common, private and public) are available. Those 
with 4 or more water assets also have the largest land assets. The stakeholders had bought 
more land and invested in several wells, including tubewells, demonstrating commitment 
to farming. The three stakeholders with the most secure water access belonged to the same 
family and reported their assets undivided. If they had divided them according to 
hereditary rules, it would have resulted in a different situation: the two taggourts and 
hectares of land would have been divided in 4,5 according to four brothers and a sister, and 
then further on to their children. 
According to the interviewees, tubewells are the most secure access to irrigation 
water in Ait M’hamed. The proprietor told me that although they have never run 
completely out of water, during dry periods their water availability is limited to 30 minutes 
per day in comparison to 3-4 hours after floods. On the other hand, during dry periods, all 
other wells are in practice unusable, which makes tubewells the most superior mode of 
access. His wells were located in the extensions; he was happy with the larger tracts of 
land available and the liberty of not having to wait for his irrigation turn. 
Table 13 is a water security classification done for the large-scale farmers on the 
basis of their water assets, namely working wells and tubewells. Data is principally sorted 
according to the total amount of water sources and secondarily according to land area (ha). 
Additionally I’ve bolded farmers with ‘secure’ wells that provide enough water even 
during dry periods. Although wells and tubewells are in separate categories, in Bour El 
Khorbate neither type explicitly provides a more secure water access.  
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Table 13 Large-scale farmers' water access 
Water 
user 
Land area 
(ha) 
Wells 
(working/total) 
Tubewells 
(working/ total) ONEP 
BK 3 0/1 1/1 n 
BK 4,5 0 1/5 n 
BK 5 2/2 0 n 
BK 6 2/4 0 n 
BK 7 2/3 0 n 
BK 15 2/3 0 n 
BK 7 0 3/3 n 
BK 8 1/1 2/2 n 
BK 10 4/4 0 n 
BK 20 4/4 0 n 
n=no, x=yes BK= Bour El Khorbate bolded=secure well 
1 water source (working well) 3 working wells 
2 working wells 4 working wells 
 
Unlike in other fieldwork sites, in Bour El Khorbate four farmers said they have 
enough water to satisfy their irrigation water needs throughout the year (bolded). Each had 
one or two wells that retained an adequate water supply during dry periods. While the 
depth of the ‘secure’ wells varied from 20 meters up to 100 meters, they were all located 
close to a river maximising the infiltration from floods. I was told the replenishing effect of 
floods lasts approximately a month after which the groundwater level of the wells starts to 
sink again. Adequacy of water is a subjective notion and directly related to farmers’ choice 
of crops: while most concentrated on less water-consuming cultures such as date palms and 
olive trees, one of these water-rich investor was able to grow carrots (1,5 ha), sugar peas 
(0,4 ha) and turnips (0,3 ha) for sale. Vegetables grow fast and provide a good income but 
consume large amounts of water. 
The least secure access to water was found confined to an area of sulphurous and 
saline groundwater, where the smaller farms were located. One of the farmers had 
inherited the lands from his grandfather and possessed two wells: one had been dug by the 
grandfather and was deepened to 130 meters in 2004. During floods, it could supply water 
for 24 hours a day, otherwise it would work for 3 hours, then need a recovery time of 8 
hours, after which it could be used again for 3 hours. The other well only worked 
occasionally. Since there is not tap water provision in Bour, the family fetched drinking 
water from their neigbour’s well, which had good quality water. 
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The other smaller investor had dug four tubewells without finding enough water 
and was on the brink of bankruptcy11 trying to feed his herd: because of water scarcity he 
had to buy all the fodder instead of cultivating it himself. In addition, the water he had 
found was acid; a fact not disclosed when he bought the land from the previous owner. His 
family had decided to become sheep breeders after abundant rains in early 2000s with the 
money they gained from selling land in the central oasis. In the beginning there was 
enough water in the wells and they were able to cultivate a hectare of wheat in addition to 
fodder and vegetables. Nowadays they are only able to grow small amounts of fodder, 
herbs and vegetables when the water situation permits. 
Those with several working wells or tubewells didn’t necessarily cultivate or 
irrigate their total land area either. This wasn’t always due to lack of water: it depended 
also on the season and the water needs of the crops. For example, an investor with 15 
hectares of land only irrigated 2,5 hectares: 1 ha of alfalfa (fodder) and 1,5 ha of date 
palms, olive trees and fig trees. His date palms had produced 7000 kg (2012), 5000 kg 
(2013) and 600 kg (2014) of dates resulting in income worth tens of thousands of euros.12 
Another investor with a total of 8 hectares only used 4 ha. His 450 date palms were fairly 
young and didn’t produce full harvests yet but eventually they would provide up to 150 kg 
of dates per tree. A third investor with two working wells had experienced water problems 
during the last few years: in 2013 he had finally sold all his sheep and cows to finance a 
new well. 
The farmers with four working wells didn’t use all of them: each had two with a 
slightly better water supply. The farmer with the best water situation and secure wells told 
his wells are able to satisfy his irrigation needs of 6 hours during the summer and 3 hours 
in the winter: fodder is irrigated once a week in the summer and once every three weeks in 
the winter except for December and January when there is no irrigation. At the time of the 
interview the groundwater level in his wells was 23 meters below ground while at best it 
rises to 17 meters below ground. While he was happy his water situation, he said he has 
always adapted his consumption according to water availability. 
In Bour El Khorbate there is no direct connection between water security and the 
number of water assets unlike in the traditional oases where water users had tried to spread 
                                                
 
11 One well costs a few thousand euros while a tubewell may cost more than ten thousand euros depending 
on the depth and nature of soil. 
12 For dates, the price per kilogram varies between 30-120 dirhams (3-11 euros) depending on the variety. 
  59 
the risk of water scarcity by adopting several modes of access. There are several reasons 
for this. First, private wells are the only available mode of access: if a well functions 
poorly, options are to fix it or dig a new one. Several investors had tried to minimise the 
risk of running out of water by drilling deep tubewells but, within the limits of the sample, 
they didn’t prove to be any more secure than shallow wells. 
Second, on the basis of the interviews, water security is a function of skills: finding 
the right spot for a well and adapting water needs to availability. As groundwater 
availability has weakened, it has become more and more difficult to find water using 
traditional methods. Within the sample, 8/10 farms had existed since the 1970s or 1980s 
indicating that the investors had been lucky in their selection of plots and placement of 
wells; only one of the early investors said he knew that the groundwater situation of his 
parcels was good when he bought the land. The others said they didn’t know the exact 
water availability but back in the day, there was water everywhere, it was easy to find and 
reach: the depth was between 12 and 17 meters. Those less fortunate have left; there are 
several abandoned farms in the area. In the next section I will discuss the farmers’ survival 
strategies: how they have adapted to water scarcity and to what extent and why they have 
adopted or rejected certain state-initiated practices aimed at improving water management.  
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Effects	  of	  laws	  and	  policies	  
Although water management in Ferkla oasis is still partially regulated by village councils, 
water access increasingly depends on formal property rights and modern technology: 
private land ownership topped with well permits and water-saving irrigation methods. In 
this section I will describe how the inhabitants have adapted to water scarcity and to what 
extent and why they have adopted or rejected certain state-initiated practices aimed at 
improving water management. Those practices are adoption of water-saving irrigation 
methods (drip irrigation), formal property rights (land act) and participation in associations 
(WUA). 
Stakeholder experiences and solutions 
Table 14 is a compilation of stakeholders’ coping methods towards water scarcity on the 
basis of the semi-structured interviews, as well as their solutions to improve the situation. 
The first category’s numbers indicate how many stakeholders have applied a certain 
method to overcome water scarcity. For the second category, the numbers state how many 
times each option was mentioned in interviews. Interviewees understood and responded 
the questions in their own ways often mentioning several coping strategies. “Don’t know” 
answers were left out. Answers were categorised and marked with either letter “D” 
meaning that the coping strategy aims at regulating demand (using less water) or letter “S” 
for regulating supply (having more water, improving water availability). This won’t 
necessarily result in having more water if other water sources run out but to restoring the 
customary amounts. 
To cope with water scarcity, all stakeholders had decreased the cultivated area to 
consume less water (n=34). This along with changing to less water-demanding, drought 
resistant crops is a coping strategy applied universally throughout the oasis; the cultivated 
area and crops always fluctuate according to water availability. The second most important 
consequence of water scarcity was migrating for work (n=22): all interviewees had at least 
one family member elsewhere in Morocco or even abroad, and majority of male 
respondents had themselves left in their youth. Female stakeholders had not migrated for 
work; they had stayed behind to look after the family. The respondents’ children had often 
moved away, although this may not be a consequence of water scarcity but simply wanting 
to leave the contryside. A respondent in Ait M’hamed said that even if there was enough 
water, the youth wouldn’t stay.  
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Table 14 Stakeholder interview results on coping with water scarcity 
Consequences of water scarcity  AA AZN AMH BK 
Reduce cultivated area D 12 5 7 10 
Change to drought resistant crops D 12 5 7 10 
Migrate for work D 8 3 5 6 
Dig more/deeper wells S 9 3 6 10 
Rehabilitate khettara/seguia S 10 5 6 - 
Install tap water connection S 12 - 7 - 
Install water-saving irrigation D/S - - 4 10 
Join WUA S 1 - - 3 
Sell cattle D - - - 4 
Sell land D 3 - - - 
Solutions to improve the water situation  AA AZN AMH BK 
Dams (to stock water)  S 10 3 7 5 
Rehabilitate khettara/seguia S - 4 4 - 
Dig deep tubewells S 1 3 - 2 
Install water-saving irrigation D - - 1 3 
Facilitate land and well authorisation S - 3 - 1 
Cooperate, unite, create associations D/S 3 - - - 
Get access to tap water  S - 2 - 1 
Limit groundwater use D 1 - - 2 
Pray S 1 - 1 1 
Dams (to slow down river flow) S 2 - - - 
Change to drought resistant crops D - - - 2 
Subventions for water-saving irrigation D - - - 1 
 
Nearly all of the interviewees had tried improving their water situation by digging 
more/deeper wells and/or by rehabilitating (repairing, deepening or prolonging) the 
khettaras (in Ait M’hamed and Azag N’Ouchene). Besides installing a household tap water 
connection for drinking water, these are the only methods for improving water supply that 
individuals or village councils have in their power; majority of actions decrease water use. 
Mainly investors in Bour El Khorbate had installed water-saving irrigation and joined a 
WUA to improve supply. 
Selling land came up in the interviews as something very few had resorted to (n=3), 
all in Ait Assem. Although not necessarily a direct consequence of water scarcity, it is an 
indicator of the value of land along with agriculture. In general, the interviewees 
considered their land and the remaining date palms a heritage they could not sell. Palm 
trees were highly valued because they could survive with very little water and land was 
believed to retain its value over the years. 
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To improve the water situation, respondents most frequently (n=25) mentioned 
building a large stockage dam or dams to recharge groundwater reserves. Some said they 
wanted to dam a certain river, such as Satt, or Toughachte, and mentioned places where 
dams had already been planned for years. Other popular solutions were khettara 
rehabilitation works, deep tubewells to access untapped aquifers, and spreading the use of 
water-saving irrigation methods. Particularly in Azag N’Ouchene people wanted 
authorities to facilitate land and well registration procedures to access subventions. In Ait 
Assem, several interviewees mentioned forming associations or cooperatives to manage 
the palm grove. 
Very few people suggested limiting groundwater use: one interviewee from Ait 
Assem blamed the investors in Bour El Khorbate for pumping the aquifer dry for which 
their water use should be monitored and limited. A few others agreed that new extensions 
should not be allowed in order to prevent overuse of goundwater. Most interviewees, 
however, believed that groundwater use should not, and could not, be limited because they 
depended on it and already had too little. 
In sum, all stakeholders in every fieldwork area had reduced the irrigated area and 
changed to drought-resistant crops as well as dug more/deeper wells. Equally many had 
also migrated in search of livelihoods. However, where the small-scale farmers and large-
scale farmers differ is focusing on certain modes of access and technologies in order to 
increase water supply. In traditional oases, stakeholders had relied on rehabilitating 
khettaras/seguias and obtained tap water connections, whereas in agricultural extensions 
they had installed drip irrigation and joined WUAs. 
To improve the water situation, stakeholders almost unanimously wanted 
authorities to increase water supply and improve water security by constructing 
groundwater-recharging stockage dams. Some determined khettara users still wanted to 
invest in common-property infrastructure. Most solutions aim at increasing supply and not 
regulating demand; stakeholders had already tried most means of limiting water use and 
could not, or would not, reduce their consumption more because they already had too little. 
Law and policy implementation 
This section focuses on the extent and reasons why stakeholders have adopted or rejected 
certain state-initiated practices aimed at improving water management - participation in 
associations (WUA), water-saving irrigation methods (drip irrigation) and formal property 
rights (land acts and well authorisations) - and how this has affected their water access and 
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availability. WUAs are indicators of IWRM policies promoting participation and 
responsibilisation. Water-saving irrigation methods are increasingly sponsored by 
agricultural authorities as part of rationalising water use according to the Green Morocco 
Plan. Formal property rights are the core of neoliberal laws and policies and a precondition 
for improved monitoring. 
WUAs	  –participative	  irrigation	  management	  
Water users’ associations (WUAs) are formal institutions created to improve water 
management with the notion of decentralisation and participation. Water users’ 
associations are either drinking or agricultural water users’ organisations but unlike 
elsewhere in Morocco with perennial rivers (Keita 2006; Riaux 2006), in Ferkla they are 
only charged for maintaining diversion dams, which conduct floodwater into irrigation 
canals and fields (ORMVA-TF interview December 2014). As of 2012, there were 11 
WUAs in Ferkla with a total number of 728 members (see Table 15). 
Table 15 List of WUAs in Ferkla area (2012) 
Perimeter Name of WUA Creation date Members Area (ha) 
Khorbate Bour Khorbat 09/1995 46 300 
Chtam Chtam Tinjdad 04/1997 60 800 
Ait Labzem Sounboula 05/1998 28 70 
Satt Satt Tinjdad 06/2002 40 100 
Khettara Ferkla Essoufla El Amal 06/2002 46 300 
Ait Assem Asagam 12/2002 34 40 
Gardmit Afrouke 05/2003 35 250 
Ait Frah Asrir Ait Frah 07/2003 60 230 
Lahcini Lahcini 04/2004 80 600 
Ait Hammou Ait Hammou 09/2005 154 40 
Bour El Khorbat Boukarmoude 01/2009 145 1200 
Source: ORMVA-TF December 2014 
 
Two of the fieldwork areas, Ait Assem and Bour El Khorbate, have a WUA. In Ait Assem 
it was created for the maintenance of a rehabilitated seguia in 2002 and in Bour El 
Khorbate for a similar purpose in 2009. One of my interviewees in Ait Assem belonged to 
the WUA although there was some confusion when I asked the interviewees whether they 
belonged to a water users’ association (fr. association des usagers des eaux agricoles 
AUEA). The concept of WUA was fairly unknown and people usually understood the word 
association to mean something like a women’s cooperative or an NGO. 
The WUA in Ait Assem no longer exists and the seguia is not maintained properly. 
However, several respondents talked about recreating a community irrigation system to 
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take care of the palm grove. They were deeply worried about the state of the area: erosion 
caused by floods, death of the date palms because of drought and general neglect. 
Nevertheless, only a few of the interviewees actually cultivate their lands due to lack of 
water (three women and two men) and the proponents were not among them. They 
acknowledged this and suggested drilling deep tubewells and sharing the water. 
In Bour El Khorbate, three out of ten interviewees belonged to association 
Boukarmoude, the rest either said there weren’t any associations or that they were not 
interested in joining one. One of the members of Boukarmoude explained that the 
association was created because of the construction of a seguia passing through the area. 
The project was conducted by ORMVA-TF and financed by a foreign donor (Millennium 
Challenge Corporation). Boukarmoude members were supposed to participate in the 
project but once the cooperation agreements had been signed, ORMVA-TF stopped 
working with them. It was unclear whether the cooperation ended before or after the 
completion of the project. In any case, the association has been inactive ever since. 
According to ORMVA-TF, WUAs have been created because the law expects 
creation of associations and cooperatives to engage the local populations in order to 
improve the sustainability of projects (interview December 2014). ORMVA-TF personnel 
admitted that while officially the associations and they are partners, because most WUA 
members lack training and capacity and the associations have no funding, they mostly do 
what ORMVA-TF asks them to. They estimated that majority of the WUAs are limited to a 
few active members. I interviewed men who were cleaning one of the diversion dams and 
they confirmed that participation in collective works is weak since there are no financial 
benefits and most of the time there is no water either. Therefore, their effect on water 
security (access to or availability) has been minimal. 
While agricultural water users’ associations have become inactive because of 
physical water scarcity, it remains to be seen how the drinking water associations will 
manage in Bour El Khorbate and Azag N’Ouchene. If successful, they will enable clear 
improvements in water security, especially in the latter. 
Water-­‐saving	  irrigation	  
In Moroccan agricultural and water policies, rational water use refers to effective and 
productive water use by maximising the value of water and reducing losses. This is 
encouraged with volumetric water pricing and agricultural subventions for installing water-
saving irrigation systems to replace surface irrigation. Ironically, the only water people 
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have to pay for in Ferkla is drinking water (ONEP tap water); irrigation water is free of 
charge in the oasis zones unlike elsewhere in Morocco, where farmers pay ORMVA for 
water provision according to used quantities (Doukkali 2005, p. 79). 
In the commercial, larger farms of Bour El Khorbate, 9 out of 10 respondents had 
installed drip irrigation systems on at least some of their fields, earliest several years ago in 
2005 and latest in 2014. When I asked why they had done so, they replied they had to 
because they didn’t have enough water. Properly executed, the conversion from surface to 
localised irrigation is a large investment requiring construction of a stockage basin (more 
than 3000 m3 of water) and installation of a water treatment and pumping station. In 
addition to the expensive initial investments, the operation costs are not cheap: for 
example, drip irrigating 4 hectares costs about 12000 DH per year, which is approximately 
1100 euros. Some investors did complain about the high expenses. 
The Moroccan government grants generous support for hydro-agricultural 
investments including 80-100% subventions for drilling tubewells, installing motors for 
pumping groundwater and constructing water treatment stations (Royaume du Maroc 
2013). These are accessible to all who have land acts and well authorisations (or even 
declarations of unauthorised water points). Only two of the investors had received state 
subventions to cover some of the drip-irrigation installation costs; a third one had applied 
for reimbursement but his request had been denied because he cultivated oranges among 
date palms. A fourth investor was in the process of installing his system and applying for 
funding. 
However, it is unclear whether this method actually leads to reductions in water 
use. Since the investors had been able to reduce their water consumption with the help of 
localised irrigation, as a result many were planning to extend the cultivated area to make 
use of all available water resources. The question remains, is the purpose of water-saving 
irrigation to reduce water consumption or to produce more with the same amout of water? 
Among small-scale farmers, drip irrigation was not a popular water saving method: 
out of 24 interviewees only four had tried it, all in Ait M’hamed. This was possible 
because they owned larger parcels in the extensions. None had built a stockage basin or 
invested in a treatment unit, they had just installed water hoses in the fields and pumped 
groundwater straight in unfiltered. The results were disencouraging because the 
groundwater was calcareous and therefore quickly blocked the nozzles of the drip-
irrigation system. Each had made the investment with their own money; they hadn’t 
received any government incentives. 
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Most small-scale farmers hadn’t converted to drip irrigation because of lack of 
water, lack of finances and unsuitability of their fields: in small-scale irrigated perimeters 
(palm groves) the gravitary irrigation system combined with small, disoriented parcels 
prevents the installation of drip irrigation which requires pressurising the water (with 
pumps) to make it flow through the pipes and larger land areas (5 ha) to be profitable. This 
was also confirmed by ORMVA-TF. Another obstacle to water saving is thus land 
ownership. An ORMVA-TF employee mentioned that one alternative for improving water 
availability in palm groves could be a collective pumping station powered with solar 
panels to reduce fuel costs. Such arrangements exist in Goulmima where they are managed 
by WUAs. However, there aren’t any in Ferkla because of water shortage. 
Property	  formalisation:	  well	  permits	  and	  land	  acts	  
Each water extraction point has been subject to declaration since the promulgation of the 
Water Law in 1995. The declaration time has been extended several times with the latest 
deadline in October 2015. Despite a generous time frame of 20 years, majority of my 
interviewees had not registered their wells; while everyone was aware of this requirement, 
many explained that since their wells had been dug years ago, they did not need to be 
registered. Some also knew the threshold depth of 40 meters and used that as their defence. 
In Ait Assem, none of the stakeholders’ wells had been authorised. As one 
interviewee concisely put it: “I’m not interested.” In Azag N’Ouchene, none of the 
surveyed wells had been authorised either. The whole village lacked land acts, which 
prevented the inhabitants from complying with the authorisation requests. One respondent 
remarked dryly that fortunately authorities turn a blind eye to the situation since it is in 
their interests to keep the inhabitants where they are. Same trend continued in Ait 
M’hamed, where according to villagers, only a fraction of wells are authorised because of 
missing land acts; none of the stakeholders had well permits. One interviewee added that 
water authorities do not easily grant well permissions since the area is classified as a water 
scarce zone or a red zone (fr. zone rouge). In Bour El Khorbate, the situation was different: 
six out of ten interviewees had well authorisations –for some of their wells– in order to 
receive state subventions. However, none of the wells had a water meter to measure 
consumption. 
Essentially, the issue comes down to land ownership. A villager in Ait M’hamed 
explained that original landowners or those who have inherited their lands (and wells) 
rarely formalise their property because the property lines are often unclear and the 
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formalisation process is complicated. Several people explained that in the past, land 
belonged to the person who cultivated it (fr. un attestation d’usage) and nobody questioned 
the legitimacy of the ownership. Until recently, it has only been necessary to officially 
prove ownership when selling land. Before, it was proved by presenting ten witnesses who 
confirmed that the person was the rightful owner of the land. Unfortunately, because many 
abused the system and claimed lands that did not rightfully belong to them, the authorities 
changed the procedures. Cheating was possible because the historical divisions of common 
lands executed by village councils have never been officially recognized or formalised and 
individual plots have never been demarcated. 
In all fieldwork areas, only landowners who had purchased land, had acts for those 
particular parcels. In Ait Assem, 5/12, in Ait M’hamed 1/7 and in Bour El Khorbate 7/10 
had official land acts. In every fieldwork area, some stakeholders had ownership 
documents, which differ from the land acts in such way that no land taxes are paid and 
formalisation takes five years. 
The situation in Azag N’Ouchene was quite exceptional. Nowadays to be granted a 
formal land act, one needs to provide the authorities with a certificate of ownership signed 
by the chief of the village council (fr. le representant de groupement ethnique) and the 
cheikh13. In Azag N’Ouchene, the village council has not had a chief since the death of the 
previous one in 1980s. Several people speculated on the possible reasons behind this. The 
village council consists of representatives of all landed fractions and each interest group 
(nine in total) wants their man as the chief. Some of the interviewees explained that the 
deadlock resulted from historical power struggles (before and during French 
colonialisation) between nomads and sedentarised populations and that it was an attempt to 
marginalise the nomads who were the original landowners. If their historical land rights 
were recognized, the others would be left with nothing. 
I couldn’t determine whether the inability to appoint a chief was due to intra-village 
schisms between fractions or higher-level political power plays (unwillingness of a 
regional governor to approve the villagers’ choice). In any case, while the inhabitants had 
been able to divide the common lands without a chief in the 1990s, due to changes in 
property formalisation procedures, they are now unable to obtain land acts without one. 
Without land acts, it is impossible to obtain well authorisations and government subsidies. 
                                                
 
13 Cheikh and moqaddem are local government representatives who handle administrative and social affairs 
in villages. 
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It also prevents people from receiving permissions and allowances to repair their houses 
after flood damage. 
Water and agricultural authorities were more than aware of the constraints related 
to land acts and well permits and the subject was clearly a sensitive topic. There also 
seemed to administrative issues between the authorities: ORMVA could only provide 
information on agricultural wells (the communal pumping stations) and ABH on ONEP 
wells and official groundwater surveillance wells. This was despite the fact that both 
ORMVA and ABH are supposed to work together while granting well permits. Each 
person I interviewed was reluctant to estimate the total number of declared, authorised or 
existing undeclared wells. In any case, one of the interviewees showed me an unpublished 
annual report (fr. rapport de gestion), which stated that during 2008, a provincial technical 
committee had processed 53 well authorisation requests distributed around the operating 
area of ORMVA-TF. The authorisations were granted to irrigate approximately 269 ha. He 
explained that for the last two years (2013-2014), authorities had been campaigning to 
encourage people to register their wells but wouldn’t evaluate the success of the campaign. 
When I asked how people could be encouraged to authorise their wells, an ORMVA-TF 
interviewee said that agricultural subventions are a financial incentive to well 
formalisation. Additionally, they emphasized that while the final responsibility lies within 
the river basin agency (ABH), government representatives (moqaddem, cheikh) are 
accountable for monitoring well construction within their territories. 
One of the key informants expressed doubt about the declaration requests pointing 
out that applying for authorisation does not guarantee a well permit, on the contrary, one 
might end up losing the well in case it is not given permission (interview December 2014). 
In his opinion, people don’t trust the authorities because they don’t offer enough 
guarantees for owners of undeclared wells. 
In sum, while land acts have allowed investors in Bour El Khorbate to access 
government subsidies to finance drilling wells and installing drip-irrigation systems, and 
thus improved their water security, farmers in traditional oasis have not been tempted. One 
reason could be unwillingness to pay land taxes and another lack of guarantees. The 
example of Bour El Khorbate shows that with the right incentives, people will formalise 
their property. Nevertheless, the Water Law is only enforced halfway: there are no water 
meters to actually monitor whether the water use stays within the limits set in the 
authorisations.  
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Discussion	  
The aim of this thesis was to describe the results of a transfer from community-based 
resource management to a space of institutional hybridity comprising of customary and 
formal socio-legal institutions and actors, and evaluate how this transfer of authority from 
customary water user communities to individuals and state organisations, as well as related 
national laws and policies have affected water access and availability in the oasis. Through 
fieldwork in four locations, I have described the water cultures of Ferkla oasis and how 
different stakeholders have experienced water scarcity. In this final section, I will discuss 
the most important findings in light of the theoretical framework and analyse water 
scarcity as a physical water shortage as well as a social construct induced by policies as 
Mehta (2007) has suggested. 
Water as social power 
Within the theoretical framework of political ecology, social power relations define access 
to and control over water (Swyngedouw 2009). Social power is vested in water 
management institutions, structures of supply and delivery as well as choices of 
technological systems. In this thesis, power is understood as a structural difference in 
access to and control over water made visible by differing property rights and water 
resources. While water security –availability of and access to adequate, reliable quantities 
of acceptable quality water– became a measure of social power denoting access to; 
adoption or rejection of formal property rights –and other state-initiated reforms– 
demonstrates the degree of change in control over water and land. 
Research on water management has shown that access to water depends on the 
actual and historic water use and distribution practices, including the different norms and 
discourses user groups refer to when claiming access (Ahlers & Zwarteveen 2009). 
Institutions, understood as laws, policies, customs and organisations, have different origins 
and sources of legitimization, such as formal state law or customary socio-legal systems, 
and the struggle for the most legitimate one is constant. Morocco in engaged in a 
neoliberal water management agenda, which requires institutional and legal reforms to 
effectively monitor and manage the scarce water resources. These reforms include the 
enforcement of formal property rights, introduction of new technologies to save water, as 
well as decentralised forms of governance via water users’ associations. 
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Formal property rights are believed to be the main condition for efficient water use 
because they enable treatment of water as a transfearable and marketable economic good 
(Ahlers & Zwarteveen 2009). However, problems emerge when policies only take into 
account actors who are recognisable and identifiable in neoliberal terms, often at the 
expense of customary water users who lack formal property rights. Reallocation or 
takeover of water resources already used by local communities is called water grabbing 
(Franco, Mehta & Veldwisch 2013). Research focusing on water grabbing investigates 
how material, discursive, administrative and political power is mobilised to enable water 
reallocation and changes to tenure relations and how this affects local livelihoods and 
social relations. In this final section I will discuss how social power relations have affected 
access to and control over water. I use water security as a measure of social power in terms 
of water access and the adoption or rejection of formal property rights –and other state-
initiated reforms– as measures of control over water. 
Physical	  water	  scarcity	  
Water security is the capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate 
quantities of acceptable quality water for maintaining livelihoods, human wellbeing, and 
socio-economic development (UN-Water 2013). Actual physical water availability 
fluctuates over time and space and is dependent on both natural causes (ecosystemic 
factors and processes) and anthropogenic effects (human actions influence supply and/or 
increase demand). In Ferkla both natural and anthropogenic factors have contributed to a 
decreased water availability. 
Rainfall is highly irregular –seasonally and annually– with identified dry periods 
during early 1970s, 1980s, 2000s and 2010s. Several interviewees agreed that before the 
massive rains of November 2014, the area had seen its previous good rainfall around 2007. 
All rivers passing through Ferkla have been dry for the last 30 years except for in times of 
flash floods. Looking from a river basin wide perspective, Todgha-Ferkla, the most 
important river contributing to water availability in the oasis, actually has water in the 
upstream parts: before reaching Ferkla, it flows through the oasis of Tinghir where it dries 
up leaving no water for the inhabitants downstream except for during floods. 
The occurrence of floods decreased 1985-2008 resulting in weaker aquifer recharge 
by infiltration. Combination of rainfall and groundwater data demonstrated clear links 
between precipitations and groundwater levels. The most important source of groundwater 
in Ferkla is the quaternary aquifer located around the central oasis. With an estimated 
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annual renouvable volume of 6-10 million cubic meters, it has been the water source for 
many wells and khettaras, which due to a faster groundwater withdrawal rate (circa 18 
million cubic meters) than renewal rate have dried up as the water table has sunk. 
ABH surveillance wells in Ksar El Khorbate and Ait Assem had registered a 
downward trend in groundwater levels. In the Ksar El Khorbate well, which ABH claims 
does not represent the quaternary aquifer, the groundwater level had fallen approximately 
10 meters between 1976-2009. In Ait Assem, the fall was 15 meters 1976-2005. While 
latest figures were not available, interviewees in those areas confirmed that the 
groundwater level has stayed around 20-30 meters during the last few years. 
In other fieldwork areas, I couldn’t systematically analyse long-term changes in 
groundwater levels on the basis of my own data since interviewees couldn’t remember how 
high or low the water table used to be at some exact moment except for recollections of the 
water level being universally higher during the 1970s. Most people in fieldwork areas 
claimed that groundwater level used to be approximately 10-15 meters below ground while 
everywhere else, except for in Azag N’Ouchene, it has permanently fallen to around 20-30 
meters. Although the samples were limited, the data was consistent and could be 
generalised to represent the situation in each fieldwork area. 
I also tried to review the effects of physical water scarcity on the khettaras but 
there was not much change between 2005-2014; those three that the authorities deemed 
desiccated had already had extremely weak debits or limited irrigated areas back in 2005. 
In addition, I was explained that khettara debits have never been stable and that they have 
always depended on precipitations and constant rehabilitation works. On one hand, the fact 
that the situation has remained stable is good news: either groundwater availability has not 
worsened too much or rehabilitation works have helped. However, I had no information on 
the current khettara debits; in reality the amounts of water provided by the khettaras may 
have diminished a great deal. In fact, interviewees in Azag N’Ouchene reported a complete 
drying up of their khettara and wells during the last few summers. This happened purely 
out of natural reasons: the village of Azag N’Ouchene is located upstream a river, there 
aren’t any other water users competing for the same resources before them. 
The khettara of Ait M’hamed has also long been unable to satisfy the villagers’ 
water needs as demonstrated by a large number of private wells. In this case the reasons 
are both physical water scarcity as well as other water users upstream. River Toughachte 
(also called Taghouchte) is shared between several ksour from upstream to downstream: 
Taghouchte, Taghia and Ihandar. The khettara of Ait M’hamed is over 2 kilometers long 
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and following the course of the river Toughachte it has nearly reached Ihandar. While 
khettara protection laws set buffer zones upstream each khettara, even if there weren’t any 
water extraction points within that radius, any water use upstream has an effect on the 
water availability downstream. 
As there was no data on groundwater volumes with the exception of the quaternary 
aquifer, I couldn’t estimate how adequate or sustainable the groundwater resources are. 
However, the fact that several interviewees told their wells had already reached the bottom 
of the aquifer (the schists) without finding more water means that the water resources are 
seriously limited. While the quality of groundwater was good everywhere else except for 
in certain parts of Bour El Khorbate, irregularity of rainfall and floods decreases the 
reliability of overall water availability. 
Based on the findings, it is clear that from the physical availability perspective, the 
whole oasis is lacking water to the extent of posing a risk to maintaining livelihoods, 
human wellbeing, and socio-economic development. Even drinking water is transferred to 
Ferkla from the neighbouring oasis (Goulmima), which has a better water situation. Next I 
will discuss the other side of water security, water access, and how social power relations 
define the access to water according to stakeholders’ differing rights and resources. 
Access	  to	  and	  control	  over	  water	  
Research on water management has shown that access to water depends on the actual and 
historical water use and distribution practices, including the different norms and discourses 
user groups refer to when claiming access (Ahlers & Zwarteveen 2009). In Ferkla, until the 
individualisation of water use by the introduction of private wells and the replacement of 
customary modes of governance by state organisations, the village councils had power 
over all aspects of water and land management from allocating water and land rights to 
deciding their distribution. When agriculture and housing extended outside the ksour and 
palm groves, the strict social control of the village councils declined resulting in a power 
vacuum. Customary institutions have no power over private wells (except they can prevent 
building them too close to the khettara) and the formal institutions have no resources to 
enforce their powers: until now, in the extensions characterised by private irrigation, 
farmers with motorpumps have used all available water whenever they have needed to. 
Since the 1960s, when ORMVA-TF took charge of agricultural development, and 
1980s, when municipalities started providing drinking water (and later on ONEP), the 
control over water management has gradually shifted to formal institutions. Morocco’s 
  73 
adoption of the Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) approach has caused a 
wave of decentralizing water management by creating new institutions. With the 
establishment of river basin agencies (ABH) and formal private property rights, the state 
has aimed at creating uniform laws to replace the various customary management 
institutions, and establish a more strict control over water resources. In spite of that, water 
users’ associations (WUAs) and formal property rights have not filled the institutional 
vacuums left behind by weakened customary institutions and a transfer from community-
based water management to private irrigation. 
The state of the customary management institutions varied between fieldwork 
areas. In Bour El Khorbate, the village council’s power had ended with the permanent 
division and sale of common lands to private individuals. In Ait Assem, livelihood change 
resulting from water scarcity, migration, urbanisation and overall socio-economic 
development had made the village council redundant. On the contrary, in villages with 
working khettaras, the customary institutions were still active. In Ait M’hamed, four 
traditional chiefs managed local affairs. In Azag N’Ouchene, however, while the village 
council existed and the position of the amghar of the palm grove was circulated annually 
between the fractions, the jmaâ hadn’t had a chief since the death of the previous one in 
1980s. 
In this situation of institutional hybridity, water access depends on both customary 
and formal laws and policies: water-right holders have access to common-property 
infrastructure (khettaras and seguias), nearly all of the agglomerations are connected to the 
state-provisioned tap water supply network and each individual may dig wells on their 
property as long as they obtain permission to do so. However, the adequacy, reliability and 
quality of water provided by these modes of access vary. 
To secure their water availability, stakeholders had often gained access to several 
water sources. In Azag N’Ouchene and Ait M’hamed, majority of households had wells for 
domestic water and at least khettara water for irrigation. The latter had quite recently 
(during 2000s) been connected to ONEP tap water supply network as a result of PAGER 
rural water supply program. Also in Ait Assem, drinking water came from household wells 
before the introduction of communal standpipes in 1980s and later on household tap water 
connections. In Bour El Khorbate, since the introduction of irrigated agriculture in 1970s, 
the only perennial water source has been groundwater, which can only be accessed via 
private wells. With the exception of a recently built seguia, there is no common-property 
irrigation infrastructure available. Therefore the investors had invested in several wells. 
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Based on a comparison of stakeholders’ water and land assets, it seems that those 
who have invested in land and multiple modes of access (especially private wells) are 
better off in terms of overall water security. Among small-scale farmers, the best situation 
was found in Ait M’hamed where all three modes of access –common-property, individual 
wells, and state-provisioned tap water– were available. Nevertheless, in reality only tap 
water supply wasn’t affected by physical water shortages. All other water sources provided 
smaller, unreliable quantities of water in the absence of groundwater-recharging floods. In 
Ait Assem, most interviewees relied on tap water and had abandoned farming. In Azag 
N’Ouchene, all villagers suffered from recurrent drying up of their water sources. 
When it came to large-scale farmers, best water security was found among those 
who had strategically placed their wells near rivers, adopted water-saving irrigation 
methods and formalised their property. Only four stakeholders were content with their 
water situation and they were all commercial large-scale farmers. 
In this thesis, I defined power as a structural difference in access to and control 
over water made visible by differing property rights and water resources. Originally I 
separated stakeholders into two groups on the basis of their water rights: customary water 
right holders and water rightless landowners. In the course of the research project, it 
became clear that this dichotomy was also a division between small-scale subsistence 
farmers relying on customary water rights and common-property access, and large-scale 
commercial farmers relying on individual access and formal property rights. Why has the 
division grown so deep? 
Neoliberal water management reforms can be analysed applying Foucault’s concept 
of governmentality (Foucault 1991). It is a form of governance that indirectly controls 
individuals by shaping the field of possible actions to make them act, as they ought to, out 
of ‘free’ will (Lemke 2002; Shamir 2008). In line with IWRM thinking, Moroccan water 
laws and policies have aimed at decentralising authority and responsibility to sub-state 
actors in order to improve water management. To encourage water users to adopt formal 
property rights without coercion, authorities have shaped the field of possible actions by 
offering agricultural subventions as rewards. Because the choice is made out of free will, 
should water users fail to comply, they will bear the consequences alone. 
The weak rate of adoption among small-scale subsistence farmers in comparison to 
large-scale commercial farmers suggests that the field of actions was biased. The laws and 
policies have targeted and benefited small- and large-scale farmers differently resulting in 
a clear division of adoption and rejection. These circumstances bear remarkable 
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resemblance to Budd’s account of Chile (2004), recent research on water-saving irrigation 
adaptation in coastal Morocco (Jobbins et al. 2015) as well as wider political ecology 
critique of presenting technological measures as a miracle solutions to water scarcity 
(Ahlers & Zwarteveen 2009; Mehta 2007). In Chile, the creation of tradable private 
property rights led to a reduced access to (legal) water and increased vulnerability to 
drought for small-scale farmers because large-scale farmers were more capable of 
formalising their property –in addition to having more incentives to do so since it granted 
them access to government subsidies (Budds 2004). In Morocco, water issues are framed 
and addressed in a highly technical manner by prescribing large dams to relieve droughts 
or drip irrigation to decrease water demand, without taking into account the historical, 
social and political factors behind water scarcity or differences in access to water between 
user groups. 
Favouring commercial large-scale farmers over subsistence farmers is in line with 
neoliberal water management, which aims at allocating water to profitable uses. Large-
scale farmers contribute to the region’s socio-economic development by employing 
workers and cultivating cash crops. They also most likely consume more water than small-
scale farmers making it rational to try to control their water use. However, while 
formalising land and water assets has provided large-scale farmers with the legal rights and 
technology to efficiently consume water, their water use is not monitored at all. Each well 
permit defines the size of the irrigated area and an average annual water debit to be used 
but says nothing about the total water volumes that can be withdrawn and does not enforce 
installing a water meter. In the absence of effective regulatory arrangements, owners of 
authorised wells are in theory able to use as much water as they want. The fact that after 
installing drip irrigation, several interviewees were planning on extending the irrigated 
area, tells about the failure of these policies to limit groundwater use. 
At the same time as commercial farmers have benefited from state subventions, the 
customary water and land right holders, who have not formalised their individual land or 
water assets, have emerged as illegal water users dispossessed of their hereditary rights. 
Moroccan water policies guiding the acquisition of well authorisations and agricultural 
subventions only consider users with formal property rights (land acts). The official 
policies justify the takeover and reallocation of water resources by invoking to neoliberal 
discourses of water as a scarce resource best managed rationally as an economic good: it 
has to be properly monitored and water users have to pay for what they use (CESE 2014). 
Ironically, irrigation water is free of charge; commercial farmers are encouraged to profit 
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at the expense of other inhabitants relying on the same common resource for subsistence 
farming and household needs. As Johnston (2003) has written, water scarcity reflects how 
water is valued. Enclosure of a common resource entails redefining the meaning and value 
of the resource. In Ferkla, water’s value has changed from a resource critical to a 
traditional way of life, to an economic commodity supporting the growth of the national 
economy. 
From small-scale farmer’s perspective, property formalisation by obtaining a land 
act is a laborious process only done for the purpose of selling land, and installing drip 
irrigation is financially and physically infeasible. None of the subsistence farmers could 
produce enough crops for a full drip irrigation system to be anywhere near economically 
profitable. Because of water shortages, they had resorted to bare mimimum: fodder and 
dates. In this light, and taking into account land fragmentation and issues with property 
formalisation, existing agricultural subsidies are not a good enough incentive for 
subsistence farmers. Like Jobbins et al. (2015) concluded, drip irrigation, or any other 
technical fix, cannot provide miracle solutions to water scarcity without addressing the 
complex institutional barriers caused by land ownership. While water and agricultural 
authorities were aware of the challenges related to land tenure, they couldn’t provide any 
feasible solutions for solving the issues. 
Feminist political ecologists have paid attention to the unequalizing preference of 
productive over reproductive uses (domestic consumption and nonmonetized agriculture), 
and the effects it may have on food security or health and wellbeing (Crow & Sultana 
2002; Zwarteveen & Boelens 2014). Very few of the interviewees in traditional oases 
depended on agriculture for livelihood, which is a clear indication of how seriously water 
scarcity has affected them and still does. It is also a reason why they should be offered 
incentives not related to agriculture, such as tax exemptions, to encourage them to obtain 
land acts and well permits. Registration of common-property infrastructure and 
subscription to tap water supply show that with the right incentives people will comply 
with authorities’ wishes. Rehabilitation of khettaras is very expensive and without state 
support (and international development aid) right-holders would not be able to keep their 
water sources functional. State-provisioned tap water connections were heavily subsidized 
in the beginning resulting in wide adoption. 
While formal property rights have not replaced the customary institutions in 
traditional oases, nor have water users’ associations. In Ferkla WUAs have only been 
charged with maintaining diversion dams, not of traditional water infrastructure. 
  77 
According to authorities, the WUAs have been created to increase the sustainability of 
development interventions as part of decentralisation policies but like elsewhere (Kadiri et 
al. 2009) they have remained weak due to lack of financial capacity and commitment. 
While agricultural water users’ associations have become inactive because of physical 
water scarcity, it remains to be seen how the drinking water associations will manage in 
Bour El Khorbate and Azag N’Ouchene. If successful, they will enable clear 
improvements in water security, especially in the latter. 
Methodological issues 
In addition to the challenges and shortcomings discussed in the Constraints and ethical 
issues section, I wish I had realised earlier what would have been the most pertinent 
questions to ask: the real reasons for not formalising land and water assets. This would 
have made expert interviews also more focused and insightful. 
As future research topics, I recommend analysing the challenges related to land 
ownership and formal property rights as well as the small-scale farmers’ real reasons for 
not formalising their land and water assets. Studying the connections between food and 
water security among small-scale farmers would also be a feasible topic for further 
research in the area. Finally, if the plans of creating drinking water associations to manage 
potable water supply in Bour El Khorbate and Azag N’Ouchene will be implemented, they 
will provide incredibly interesting case studies for researching decentralised, participative 
water management and water users’ responsibilisation.  
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Conclusions	  
Although water management in rural Morocco, and in Ferkla oasis particularly, is still 
partially regulated by traditional village councils, water access increasingly depends on 
formal modes of access: private land ownership topped with well permits and municipal 
tap water connections. In Ferkla, customary water-right holders, who used to control all 
aspects of water management, have gradually been ‘domesticated’ into private proprietors 
and clients under state authority –to a certain extent. 
As a result of enclosure of common property lands by extending irrigated 
agriculture and private land ownership outside the traditional oases, water management has 
evolved into a space of institutional hybridity comprising of customary and formal socio-
legal arrangements and actors. The government of Morocco has adopted neoliberal water 
management principles, which require legal and institutional reforms in order to efficiently 
and rationally manage water on the basis of demand. The major effects and consequences 
of the neoliberal reforms are decentralization of water management and responsbilisation 
of water users by creating water users’ associations, promoting water-saving irrigation 
technology and encouraging property formalization which translates into well 
authorization requirements justified on the grounds of improved hydrological data and 
water use monitoring. 
Analysing power as a structural difference in access to and control over water 
embodied in differing property rights and water resources, I concluded that water scarcity 
was deepest among those without any permanently available modes of access or only 
common-property access. Customary water rights have lost their value as guarantors of 
water access due to physical water shortages and legal reforms. In oasis villages, nearly 
every household had a well to supplement khettara water. Water scarcity was least severe 
either among individuals who rely on private irrigation with (tube)wells and who have 
formalised their property, or those who have abandoned farming and rely on tap water. 
Purely looking from water security perspective, tap water proved a very secure water 
source. However, the interviewees did not perceive their water situation as secure because 
they lacked access to customary amounts: they didn’t have irrigation water to take care of 
their land and date palms. 
Although formal water rights were associated with better water security, according 
to interview results, formalisation was not a precondition for water security; on the 
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contrary, in many cases it seemed to be the consequence of worsening water availability 
and resorting to state aids in order to save water by installing drip irrigation. Formalisation 
was not a guarantee of water security either: only one person out of all those who had 
authorised their wells had received technical help from the authorities in deciding suitable 
well locations. All others had employed traditional water dowsers and borne the 
consequences of selecting good or bad locations themselves. 
While property formalisation was no a guarantee or precondition of water security, 
in Ferkla water management laws and policies have targeted and benefited small- and 
large-scale farmers differently resulting in a clear division of adoption and rejection 
between those two user groups. Attempts to improve water management by introducing 
formal private property rights have resulted in the creation of illegal water users who have 
been deprived of their customary water and land rights. At the same time, large-scale 
farmers have gained numerous benefits from formalising their land and water assets. In 
this light, state efforts have indeed led to decreased equity of resource distribution. 
Regarding control over water, while customary socio-legal organisations still 
assume responsibility over the everyday management of common-property infrastructure, 
the true control over their water access lies within the hands of government authorities in 
charge of the finances. Rehabilitation of khettaras is very expensive and without state 
support (and international development aid) right-holders would not be able to keep their 
water sources functional. The spread of tap water supply network has also increased state 
power over domestic water use; moreover, tap water is the only mode of access 
meticulously measured with water meters in order to charge the correct fees. Private 
irrigation with individual wells is the last challenge for the authorities to conquer. While 
the power of customary institutions no longer covers the extensions that have been 
permanenly divided, the formal institutions haven’t had the resources, or the will, to 
enforce their powers on private irrigators. The extensions have remained power vacuums 
until recently, when Moroccan state authorities started to enforce the Water Law more 
rigorously. 
In Morocco, authorities have only recently begun to require well authorisations: 
even though the law has existed since 1995, the first deadline for declaring illegal water 
points was in 2013 and the second in 2015 (Royaume du Maroc 2014). The current water 
law is ambiguous and interviewees claimed that their wells didn’t need to be authorised 
because they were dug before the law or they were shallower than the threshold depth of 
40 meters. Well authorisations are not a completely negative thing: they establish 
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protection zones around wells and makes sure khettaras are not affected. The inhabitants’ 
unwillingness to formalise their land and water assets is a theme that clearly requires 
further research particularly in the light of the upcoming groundwater contracts. 
The social consequences of water management policies are a deepening division in 
water security –availability and access to adequate quantities of acceptable quality water 
for maintaining livelihoods, human wellbeing, and socio-economic development– between 
traditional oases and commercial plantations. In Ferkla, oasis villages increasingly suffer 
from water scarcity due to physical shortages and government policies favouring large-
scale farming over subsistence farming. The value and importance of water has changed 
from a resource critical to a traditional way of life, to an economic commodity supporting 
the growth of the national economy. Government policies, such as the Green Morocco 
Plan, strongly push the regional agricultural development towards commercial plantations 
of high-value crops. It seems that those mirages are no places for old oases. For water 
scarcity problems to be overcome, as Zwarteveen and Boelens poignantly ask (2014), do 
the subsistence farmers with customary water rights need to disappear or correct their 
misbehaviour to join progress and development? 
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Appendices	  
Stakeholder interview questionnaire 
1. Basic information  
Name 
Age 
Place of birth 
Family (married, children) 
Level of education 
Occupation 
Since when do you live here? 
Have you or a family member worked elsewhere in Morocco or abroad? When and where? 
Why? 
 
2. Agriculture 
Do you own agricultural land? 
How did you obtain the land (heritage, purchase)? When? 
Who sold you the land and why?  
Do you have official land ownership papers? 
What is the total area of your land?  
What is the cultivated area of your land? 
Where are your parcels situated (palm grove, extension)? How many parcels do you have? 
Have you sold any land? Why?  
What are your principal sources of revenue? 
How many people work for you (seasonal, permanent)? 
 
3. Water 
Do you have a water right? How many taggourts? 
When you came here/In your childhood what where the water sources (modes of access to 
water) (drinking water, agricultural water)? 
What are your current water sources (modes of access)? Where are they? 
How many (functional) wells do you have? When were they dug? Are they authorized?  
What are your preferred water sources (modes of access)? Why? 
How has water availability changed here? Why? 
Do you have enough water? Since when? 
What have you done as a result of water scarcity? 
Which irrigation method do you use? Since when? Why?  
Have you received any government subsidies? Which ones? 
Do you belong to a water users’ association (association des usagers d’eau agricole 
AUEA)? Why? 
Do you belong to any other association? Why? 
How do you participate in the khettara maintenance? 
If the water situation becomes worse what will you do? 
How could the water situation be improved here?  
How do you see the future of the oasis?  
What are your plans for the future?  
  
Rainfall statistics 
Overall annual* precipitations of different weather stations (mm) 
Station Tadighoust Merroutcha Tamtetoucht Tinjdad 
Org. ABH ABH ABH CMV/ORMVA 
Elevation 1134m 941m 1741m 970m 
River Rhéris Tangarfa, Ferkla Todgha Ferkla 
1962/1963 218,3 
   1963/1964 58,1 
   1964/1965 304 
   1965/1966 306,8 
   1966/1967 73,8 
   1967/1968 273,4 
   1968/1969 116,8 
   1969/1970 101,6 
   1970/1971 116 
   1971/1972 189,7 
   1972/1973 179,5 
   1973/1974 130,9 
   1974/1975 188 
   1975/1976 180,4 
   1976/1977 115,2 
   1977/1978 104,7 40,5 
  1978/1979 96 77,4 
  1979/1980 301,1 210,3 
 
214,5 
1980/1981 77,8 84,5 
 
31 
1981/1982 115,2 134,3 
 
113,5 
1982/1983 96 36,2 
 
30,5 
1983/1984 34,6 16,7 
 
4,5 
1984/1985 118,6 72 
 
50 
1985/1986 117,1 97,3 
 
80,3 
1986/1987 91,1 99,2 
 
84,5 
1987/1988 164,2 99,6 
 
119 
1988/1989 170,3 128,5 
 
163,7 
1989/1990 303,3 223,7 
 
191,6 
1990/1991 118,6 96,1 
 
123,7 
1991/1992 146,1 63 
 
95 
1992/1993 63,2 56,9 
 
64,3 
1993/1994 160,3 141,5 
 
144,6 
1994/1995 135,5 126,9 
 
144,5 
1995/1996 210,5 194,3 
 
271,1 
1996/1997 95,6 76,3 
 
103,6 
1997/1998 152,8 81,8 
 
112 
1998/1999 27,6 49,3 
 
85,3 
1999/2000 75,2 109,7 
 
129 
2000/2001 5 17,5 
 
34 
  
2001/2002 140,4 98 
 
116 
2002/2003 50,6 38,5 
 
106 
2003/2004 161,1 140,9 40,2 198 
2004/2005 99,7 57 144,4 78 
2005/2006 210,5 169,8 209,2 192,7 
2006/2007 251 181,3 336,6 279 
2007/2008 219 143,7 278 164 
2008/2009 355 188,1 346,5 217 
2009/2010 142,7 147,2 243,8 165 
2010/2011 105 63,8 198,5 108,5 
2011/2012 162,4 53,3 182,5 175 
2012/2013 82 - 161,7 65,5 
2013/2014 3,7 - 24,4 41,5 
Average 144,5384615 103,2885714 - 123,5944444 
*) Agricultural years, for example 79/80 starts in September 1979 and ends in August 1980, 
Sources: ABH-GRZ December 2014, ORMVA-TF December 2014 
 
